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If the Lord Almighty had consulted me before
embarking on the Creation, I should have recom-
mended something simpler.
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On 1 August 1964 the Governor General, representing the Queen, gave
Royal Assent to a defense bill submitted by the Government of Prime Minister
Lester B. Pearson. This bill, which ended months of tumultuous parliamentary de-
bate, nearly brought the Canadian government to a halt in the conduct of other
official and important affairs of state. It also revolutionized the concept of
the traditional defense establishments so well understood and utilized by most
of the nations of the world.* This new coxicept was 'integration,' or the
combining of the three services, the Canadian Army, the Royal Canadian Navy,
and the Royal Canadian Air Force into a single service, the Canadian Ar ied
Forces.
Minister of National Defence in 1964, the Honourable Paul He. Iyer
stated
. . . we, as the laboratory of the world-wide defence reorganiza-
tion, can either advance or retard the inevitable move of other
nations in this direction. It is a heavy responsibility and we
mean to discharge it with as many thorough, all-embracing thought-
processes as we can muster.^
The reasons for introducing this radical departure from the tra-
ditional service concepts were detailed in Mr. Hel Iyer's White Paper on
Defence. The first reason was purely economic. The costs of defense were
1 Donald Creighton, Canada's First Century 1867-1967 (Toronto:
Macmillan of Canada, 1970), p. 345.
2Jon 13. McLin, Canada's Changing Defence Policy 1957-1963 The




2growing rapidly as industrial prices increased and there were other budget
demands in Canada, mainly welfare and health expenditures, requiring the use of
already restricted funds. Thus, in order to rebuild the seriously cut-raoded
defense structure with a politically imposed frozen defense budget, necessary
cutbacks were needed in the operations and maintenance and equipment fields.
Mr. Hellyer was determined to increase defense procurement to 25% of available
i
funding, an increase of 15% over the previous year, 1963-1964. He hoped to
2
save $100 million annually and to eliminate 10,000 jobs.
A second major reason for considering integration and unification
was the need to develop more defense industry in Canada to enable the industry
to produce military equipment more quickly and economically. Mr. Hellyer
noted that once the new roles for Canadian defense were established, it must
be "equipped with the- best possible 'hardware 1 regardless of the country of
origin but where capabilities are approximately equal, we certainly would
favour Canadian production."^ Consequently, various inducements were t > be
offered to Canadian industry to gain their support for this policy of r»-
emphasizing the importance of competitiveness by employing long-range planning
that would permit more effective Canadian competition.
5
A third consideration for the development of a unified armed forces
was spelled out in considerable detail in The Royal Commission on Government
*Armed Forces Management, V. X, No. 9, June 1964, p. 53.
^Canada, House of Commons, Debates , 17 February 1964, p. 1417.
-*McLin, ( Ls.i-foff-.gfoff Dgf^nce Policy , p. 197.
*Paul Hellyer, "What the VJhite Paper Means to the Air Industry,"
Department of National Defence Publication (Queen's Printer, 1966), p. 1.
^McLin, Canada's Changing Defence Policy, p. 197.

Organization s or the Glassco Commission. The Glassco Commission noted that
there were serious weaknesses in the Department of National Defence, particu-
plarly in the area of financial management. The Commission also noted that
integration might "correct recognizable defects of previous policies and or-
ganizations."J
Even a more important factor in the re-evaluation of the armed
forces was a new philosophy on defense that was developed under Prime Minister
Pearson's direction. Mr. Hellyer, fore the House of Commons, stated that
. . . Canada can make its greatest contributions to collective
defence and world order by developing well-equipped, flexible conven-
tional forces and providing the strategic mobility to move them
quickly to meet emergencies anywhere in the world.
To undertake this review of Canada's defense structure, it was necessary for the
government to analyze and re-define the tole of Canadian foreign policy struc-
ture-. This study was undertaken and the Pearson Cabinet decided to progress
with the initial phases of the defense concept of integration.
While these were the stated, official reasons of the Pearson
Government to introduce the concepts of integration and unification into the
defense structure, there were many subtle factors that appeared to have had a
greater influence on the decision-making process to determine whether or not
to proceed. The first point, while intangible, was pride. Canadians had
been dependent during its entire history on either the United Kingdom or the
United States for mutual defense of its borders and its integrity as a nation.
1J. Grant Glassco, F. Eugene Therrier, and watson Sellar, The
1 Commission on Government Organization , V. I -IV (uttawa: Queen's Printer,
2 Ibid., p. 69.
3
McLin, Canada's Changing 1 ce Policy, o. 195.
^Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 21 February 1966, p. 1562.
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As Canada approached its first 100 years of confederation in 1967, it was
understood that it was time t© rethink these relationships. This wag also
done by the Pearson Government with the determination of making the forces no
longer a specialised part of an international force but instead a "balanced,
autonomous force. "2
In addition to the pride factor, there is another that is also in-
tangible. That factor is Mr. Hellyer himself. When he moved from an obscure
back-bench party seat in the House of Commons to the position of Minister of
National Defence, he approached the j©b with his customary and well-known
3
religious seal. He correctly evaluated the situation that if the erned forces
were to progress, they must have sore aeney. Hewever, there was no additional
funding availabl« . Fac«sd with this situation, Mr, Hellyer undertook a study
of the defense structure in hJ Paper en Defence and the result was the
unique e@nce.pt of integration first, unification second.^ With the backing ©f
the Cabinet, Mr* Hellyer tabled his program before the House of Commons and the
battle, began on a new philosophy and structure of defense in Canada.
Scope of the .Thesis and Research Questions
While the entire study of the history of integration and unification
is worthy of examination, it would be difficult in a thesis of this length to
Creighton, Canada 1 s Firs t Century , p. 10.*~* *
I III! III MP— Ml ! Mill! Hi! * *
. :Lin, Cnnsda's .Changing Defence P o licy , p. 196.
3
Peter C. Neuman, Canada and the Coming of Pierre Trudeau , (New York!
Alfred A. Knopf, 1969), p. 205.
Canada, Department of National Defence, White Paper on Defence,
(Ottawa: Queen's Printer, March 1964), p. 19.
•'Canada, House of Commons, Debates , 21 February 1966, p. 1562.

5cover adequately more than one specific area within the Department of National
Defence. Therefore, the scope of the thesis will be the area of budgeting in
the defense structure. The main research question to be addressed is whether
or not integration and unification have improved the Department of National
Defence budget organizational concepts and the development and submission
procedures for the defense budget. A number of related subsidiary matters
will also be examined. The development of the concept of integration and
unification will be briefly reviewed in order to establish the necessary back-
ground and foundation for an examination of the budget development and sub-
mission process. Secondly, the Canadian budget development and submission
process used by Defence prior to integration and unification will be surveyed
in order to evaluate the changes wrought by the Glassco Commission and the
implementation c-f the new concept of intc- ^ration and unification. Thirdly,
the concepts of the unified budget organizational structure and the defense
budget development and submission process as originally conceived under
integration will be evaluated. Emphasis will be placed on the role of Planning-
i
Programraing-Budgeting Systems under the new concept. As unification and
integration have progressed, any changes that resulted from the new concept
actually in operation with that of the original concept will be compared.
Definitions
There are in Canada differences in the definitions of terms, in the
spelling of many words, and in the political system structure. 'Integration'
is one of the more commonly used words in the thesis and signifies the amalga-
mation of related and somewhat overlapping functions and activities into a single
^Telephone Interview with Mr. R. F. Lindsay, Staff, Director General
Budget, office of the Comptroller-General, Canadian Forces Headquarters, Ottawa,
Canada, 8 February 1971.

6organizational unit. After the first step of integration was undertaken by the
Department of National Defence, the concept of 'unification' was pursued. Under
that program, the- identity of the three existing services was eliminated and
the- three services, minus their duplicated functions, were formed into what has
become known as the Canadian Armed Forces. This is composed of three environ-
ments, land, air, and sea, under a single headquarters staff management of both
civilian and military authorities. The Chief of Defence Staff occupies the
highest military position in the Canadian Armed Forces and the Minister of
National Defence, a member of the Cabinet as well as a member of the House of
Commons, occupies the senior civilian position. These are similar to the
United States Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Secretary of Defense.
ougho ;t the thesis, Canadian spelling is used in direct quota-
tions and when it is found in a permanent title. For example, the word
•defence' is used when r< ng to the Canadian system.
Tie Canadian form of government is parliamentary, modeled on the
British system, with the Queen of the United Kingdom as Head of State when she
I
is in Canada* or the Governor General when she is not. The Canadian Parlia-
ment is composed of two houses. One is the House of Commons, whose representa-
tives are universally elected on a party basis, the majority party forming the
government and selecting one of its members to be the Prime Minister. The
upper house is the Senate to which members are appointed for life and in
recent years it has assumed even less responsibility and power than the British
2 ...
House of Lords. Consequently, the Cabinet, composed of the Prime Minister'
and his department ministers, such as the Minister of National Defence, is
Glassco, Rovp'; lission
, p. 10.
2.M F. Dawson, Procedure in the Canadian
^
House of Commons
(Toronto: University of Toronto press, 1962), p. 93.

in effect the Government. Thus, ell decisions affecting the country are
first approved by the Cabinet before they are presented to the House of
Commons for formal approval.
Objectives .of Thesis
The objective of the thesis will be to determine what are the
significant advantages and gains realised from the introduction of the concept
of integration and unification in a military system. In addition, this study
should b© viewed with the possibility of application of certain areas to the
United States Department of Defense as it faces similar budget reductions
because of other ce^nnds on the. available funds. Further examination of
certain phases of integration to eliminate? duplicated functions, particularly
in the budget development area 9 may lead 1:0 a better understanding of what is
necessary tc reduce the overall expenditures of the Department of Defense.
While the Canadian experience is a prototype, it deserves serious
consideration, for it is evident that whi'.e they have encountered a vast num-
ber of problems, they have achieved significant results in the areas of cost
reduction and elimination of heavily staffed and duplicated commands and their
structures* It was a difficult political decision for the Government of Prim©
Minister Lester Pearson to undertake, regardless of the economic realities
observable. The Canadian members of Parlimcnt found it difficult to accept the
closure of the many defense establishments and have been fighting these
closures in the manner so familiar to those members of the United States
Congress. While the elimination of the three distinct services was a blow to
the tradition-Minded,*- it sec,!.-; to have met less resistance than would have
*Glassco, Royal Commis sion
, p. 127.
HcLin, Canada's Changing Defenc e Policy, pp. 203-204.

8been expected, for in the eyes of the politicans, the loss of the distinct
services with their related uniforms did little to the political structure with-
in their own local political power bases. However, when a base closure was pro-
posed, that singular fact had more effect on them.
But after nearly three years of a unified armed forces, there
seems to be little, if any, opposition to a continuation of the original plan.
The release of a new White Papor on defense in May or June 1971 will detail
the future of the unification of the armed forces.
Methodology
This thesis will be developed from materials available from
military and civilian library sources in the Washington area as well as from
documents gathered from personal research in Ottawa and Montreal. Additional
sources of information were made available at the Canadian Embassy library end
at the offics of the Washington Canadian Defence Liaison Staff. Field trips to
military establishments, including Canadian Defence Headquarters, resulted in
an accumulation of material from direct personal interviews or through
correspondence and telephone conversations with members of the Canadian mili-
tary establishment.
Summary
While the scope of the thesis is restricted, the field of defense
and any new approaches to reductions in defense spending warrant further
examination. The Canadian situation, as Mr. Hellyer stated, is being closely
observed by other nations. Eecause cost reductions in the defense structure in
The Montreal Gazette, Tuesday, 13 April 1971, p. 7.

9most countries would be welcomed as long as the original missions of a defense
establishment were not jeopardized. Optimism was expressed by then Prime Min-
ister Pearson, who
seldom defended very strenuously the policies of his own
government, on the CEC-TV program "Twenty Million Questions 51 on
6 October 1966, when host Charles Lynch asked the Prime Minister:
"Are you sure that what you're going to get at the other end of
the artsed services unification program - at the business end of
it - will be effective?" Mr. Pearson calmly relpiedi "Well, if
it's not effective, then the policy will have failed. "*
However, the Canadians have logicslly 9 and certainly radically,
approached this subject and the results, while still uncertain, are revolu-
2
tionary in concept and impact, and all, on the whole, are positive in value.
This posifeiveness deserves further consideration on the part of other govern-
ments, for tradition is fine as long as nothing better is developed to re-
place it. It seems clear that the Canadians have found a new concept that can
easily and effectively replace these traditional military concepts without
totally damaging their individual defense posture.
Chapter II will deal with the historical perspective of integration
and unification and will establish the background necessary for examination of
the defense budget process in the Canadian government.
Chapter III will survey the development of the financial structure
of the Canadian Government under which the Department of National Defence
operates.
Chapter IV will examine the effect unification and the Glassco
Commission had on the Defence budget organization and the budget process and




Neuman, Coding of Trudesu, p. 85.
2
Canada, Department of National Defence, Staff Brief, 4 February
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The last chapter will evaluate the concept of integration and




DEVELOPMENT OF THE INTEGRATION
AND UNIFICATION CONCEPT
Background
The objectives of integrations leading to unif i cation s of the
Canadian armed forces were stated by the Minister of National Defence, Paul M.
Hellyer, in his 1964 White Paper on Defence, These included the economic bene-
fits to be gained from the elimination of duplicated commands and functions,
the stimulation of the Canadian defense industry, the improvement of the
financial management techniques v?ithin Defence, the decision to separate the
Canadian defense posture from United State? and British influence, and ;.
development of national pride. However, it was the 1963 Royal Commission on
Government Organ i za t i on that provided the impetus for Mar. Helly©r*s concen-
trated efforts to develop and to implement integration and unification into the
armed forces structure.
In the Glassco Commission report it was stated that "the significance
of the distinctive operating environments is declining rapidly with the develop-
ment of defence technology" and "it is increasingly recognised that to maintain
three separate organizations for such functions is uneconomic. ul Thus, regard-
less of whether or not a case could be made for unification in the long run, the
Glassco Commission found that "there are strong reasons for seeking greater
integration of those functions common to the three services."2 Throughout the




Commission Report are continual references to the economies and efficiencies
that might be realized. For example, in defining the principal tasks of the
Department of National Defence, tho Glassco Commission stated that after the
primary task of "implementing the defence plans of the Government of Canada"
other areas must be considered, including "costs and the impact of defence
expenditures on the domestic economy and the balance of international payments*"*
This led Mr. Kellyer in his Whit® Paper on Defence to repeat the significance
of cost effectiveness in the Department whex* he wrote that "the minimum re-
quirements of defence of Canada must be achieved as economically as possible. "2
Unification which followed integration was one of the significant
achievements of a remarkably long legislative record of then Prim© Minister
Lester B. Pearson* It was John Diefenbaker as Prime Minister in 1960 who
suggested tho formation of The Royal Commission on Government Organization .
Once the Conmissi.cn submitted its recommendations, Mr. Pearson directed his
Cabinet to proceed with a thorough examination of the Report and to respond to
the recommendations. It was Mr. Pearson who provided the free atmosphere in
which Mr. Hellyer could pursue his interests in improving the defense estab-
lishment.
To achieve economies Mr. Hellyer indicated that there would have to
be an analysis of the entire defense policy of the Government. He recommended
to the Prime Minister that an immediate savings would be recognized with the
1 Ibid,, p. 65.
2Richard H. Leach, ed., Contemporary Cer\r.d& (Durhan, North
Carolina: Duke University Press for the Duke University Commonwealth Studies
Center, 1967), pp. 259-260.
^Neuoan, The Conming of Pierre Trudeau , p. 45.
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withdrawal of some troops from the NATO defense establishment. But before
taking this initiative with the Government, Mr. HelXycr, with a preliminary
understanding of the Glassco Commmission recommendations, undertook advance
contacts with other governments. In a series of talks with British Defence
Minister Denis Healey and Lord Louis Mountbatten, Mr. Hellyer found a recep-
tive audience for his proposed cutbacks. 1 This insight to the acceptability
of his future overall proposal to the Government strengthened Mr. Hellyer's
determination to begin a serious study of the impact of integration and uni-
fication on the Department of National Defence. He noted that if the forces
overseas were reduced, there would be a "savings of 5000 personnel at an
annual savings of $45 million. "^
Previous Attempts at Integration and Unification
While The Royal Commission on Government Organization provided the
foundation on which the White Paper on Defence was developed, there were
instances in Canadian military history of attempts to restructure the defense
establishment. A raajority of these considerations to integrate various
commands within the three services were developed because of the increased
cost of maintaining duplicated functions and facilities. The Canadian military
establishment achieved its own force structure following World War I when
Canadian services were established from units which had been a part of the
overall United Kingdom service force. 3 The years leading up to World War II
were spent in developing and organizing these distinct services into truly
Canadian units based upon inherited British traditions. At that time there was
'•Craig Powell, "Is Trudeau building a 'Fortress Canada'?" Armed
Forces Management * XVI, No. 8, May 1970, p. 52.
2 Ibld. » p. 51.
3Leach ? Contemporary Canada , pp, 237-239.
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little pressure from th© general public to consider the effects of costs.
Because of existing protective joint agreements with the United Kingdom and
thei United States, the armed forces were maintained at a low ssnpower and
equipment level. Aside from the pressures within Quebec Province during
World V7ar II , thsre was no need for the government to consider costs during
the War. However, once the War had eneded, there was a recognisable need for
the funds spent on a large defense establishment to be directed into other
areas of social concern. Thus defense expenditures began to fall as the nation
returned to its traditional peacetime expenditure levels. However, the crisis
in Korea supplemented by Canada's expanding role and commitments on the
international scene resulted in a defense effort of increasing magnitude re-
versing the iownward trend in post-war spending. Expenditures that had been
reduced to $583 million in 1950 responded to increased defense activity and
rose to $1652 million in 1952. Manpower increased to 126.5 thousand in 1962
from 47.2 thousand in 1950. The $1652 million represented 25% of the total
federal expenditures, but defense activities in terms of employment, equipment,
and the operational costs accounted for even larger proportions of the federal
governments operations.* Following Korea, there was a growing restriction
on funis. Tha government had to consider other methods of providing the same
defense capabilities within a smaller structure while maintaining the ability
2for rapid build-up of the services should the need arise.
The joint effort by the United States and Canada was costly to
Glassco, Roval Commission, p. 62.
2
Leach, C ontemporary C r-< -. .'a « pp. 237-239.
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Canada as well as an incursion on Canadian soil and sovereignty. Thus, the
first step was to be a redirection of the role of defense for Canada. Defence
Minister Hellyer stated the views of the Canadian governments since the end of
World V'ar II when he stated
. . . the objectives of Canadian defence policy, which cannot
be distinguished from foreign policy, are to preserve the peace
by supporting collective defence measures to deter military aggression;
to support Canadian foreign policy including that arising out of our
participation in international organizations; and to provide for the
protection and surveillance of our territory, our air space, and our
costal waters.
The second step was to undertake some reorganization measures to
reduce the force structure and related defense expenditures. World War II
brought a new approach to defense policy planning and several attempts at
integration of certain areas of the defense structure. However, these early
attempts to restructure various elements of the services were often made
"from the bottom and worked upwards. "^ They were not successful. In the late
1950*s the medical and chaplain services were unified, but these changes were
not as far reaching as had been expected, for the Surgeon-General reported to,
3
as well as received direction from, the heads of the three services. This
did not permit ease in policy planning and created more inefficiencies than
positive improvements. An unsuccessful attempt was made to create an integrated
teletype relay system for the three services.
Hellyer, White Paper on Defence
, p. 4.
^Leach, Contemporary Canada, p. 239.
Glassco, Royal Commiss ion
, p. 71.
Ibid., p . 71.
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Another reorganization achievement following World War II was the
coordination at the top of the chain of command. The three separate service
ministers were replaced by the Minister of National Defence. At the same time
a separate military Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee was appointed;
however, he was not given the authority to resolve differences among the ser-
vice chiefs. The Royal Commission on Government organisation noted this de-
ficiency in its final report when it recommended that additional powers of
3
coordination be vested in the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee.
This point was further emphasized in the White Pa per on De fence in which it was
stated that "this solution does not adequately resolve the basic issues. If a
single command structure is not established, coordination by the committee
4
system will remain with all of its inevitable delays and frustrations."
The Glasseo Reco' 'ions ^and^tha Department of National Defence
With the history of early attempts at integration as background, the
Minister of National Defence began his serious re- examination of the defense
structure and policy based upon the recommendations of the Glasseo Commission.
The Commission report made three recommendations, all directed toward improved
financial raanageraent within the Department. The first was for better coordina-
tion of the activities common to the three services. The second was for more
effective application of military and civilian manpower. The third was the need
*McLin, Canada's Changing Defence Policy
, p. 198.
2
I bid., p. 198.
^Glasseo, Royal Commission, po. 69-74.




to achieve greater economies within the defense budget. 1
Previous governments had noted there were areas for improvement in
coordination, manpower, and economies but they were reluctant to pursue them
since the armed forces* while small in sise, had established a national repu-
tation for excellent service abroad and internally and therefore the forces
were a source of pride to the nation. But many government off icials recognised
the need to "correct recognizable defects of previous policies and organisa-
tions."2 Previous documentation supported the findings of the Glassco Commis-
sion concerning the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee. Its weakness
lay in the fact that each of the three members was provided with an effective
veto against decisions of that committee. This assured that each of the service
Chiefs of Staff had had direct access to the Minister of National Defence who
was not adequately equipped or staffed to always coordinate initiatives comi;
from all directions. Attacking this form of military organisation, the liassco
Commission stated that the "effectiveness of the Staff Committee as an execu-
tive authority is s to a large extent, dependent on the personal quail tins of
its members, each of whom has a virtual power of veto in its di liberations."-*
Under that established procedure, the Chiefs of Staff met each week and from
time to time collectively with the minister, who would resolve problem area's
whan he met with them. However, the continuous conflict within the Committee
had serious effect on the development and implementation of the government's
military policies.
Thus, the recommendation for improved coordination most
*Glassco, Royal C ommi
s
s i on g p. 70,
2McLin, C- g Defence Policy, p. 195,
^Glascco, Royal C< ion, p. 70.
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responsible for the Hellyer move toward unification was that there be "con-
solidation under a single executive independent of the three Chiefs of Staff
of authority and responsibility, reporting directly to the Minister of National
Defence."1 The functions of the Comptroller-General of Inspection Services and
the Judge Advocate General had been previously integrated and both positions
2
reported to the Deputy Minister of National Defence. The success of this
move was impetus to pursue further the concept of consolidation. Kovever, the
three services believed that this would cause the creation of a "fourth service
3
concept" and were against such a proposal.
Mr, Hellyer expanded the Glassco Commission recommendations to
include the entire defense structure. A single Chief of Defence Staff, as
recommended by the Commission report, would be responsible for both control
and adminsitration of the Canadian armed forces, The Glassco Commission
specifically stated that
1. Provision be made for the exercise by the Chairman, Chiefs
of Staff Committee, of the ministerial power of direction over the
armed forces, within such limits as the Minister of National Defence
may define.
2. The Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee, be given the
control and administration of such elements common to two or more
services as the Minister may designate.
3. In recognition of the change of status implicit in these
proposals, the title of the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee, be
altered to Chief of Defence Staff. 4
In the manpower area, the Glassco Commission recognized that the
armed forces were responsible for directing and regulating the manning,
Glassco, R ova 1 C o^mi ss i on
, pp. 71-72.





training, arming, supplying, and accommodating of the armed forces and
providing health and welfare services. It went on to report that "in some of
these matters the paramount consideration is the mission; in others each of
the three services will experience needs which are common to its various
missions . . , and distinguished from those of the others" and that "the
task of support will be common to all elements of the armed forces."
The Glassco Commission reported that
. . . the rigidities in the defence establishment also have
important budgetary effects. Given the relatively inflexible com-
mitments of the defence forces, any significant curtailment of
expenditure plans is likely to bear unevenly on the various elements
of the defence budget. Costs of military personnel and of operations
and maintenance are relatively uncontrollable; thus, any curtailment
tends to fall on the more controllable items, especially equipment
purchases.
^
Thus, in the progress toward a more efficient and stronger defense structure,
the rigid structure of the high command was having a noticeable adverse
effect on the economics of defense. The Glassco Commission continued this
argument further by stating that any "significant reductions in the strength
of the armed forces or reallocations of resources for defence purposes can be
made only by changing Canadian commitments within the collective defence
systems."-^
In its careful analysis of the defense structure and its policies,
The Royal Commission on Government Organization noted the weak areas in which
improvement and change would produce a more effective and efficient establish-
ment. Through its report and final recommendations, the Commission stressed




3 Ibid., p. 66.
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coordination of defense management, manpower effectiveness, and economy of the
defense dollar. The words 'integration* and 'unification' were used throughout
the report. However, the Commission noted the difficulties of implementing
more than integration of a limited nature. When the Government of Prime Minis-
ter Pearson accepted the final report, there was little thought at the time
that it would provide the stimulus for the new Minister of National Defence to
pursue a course of action that would radically change the defense structure.
All of the recommendations made by the Glassco Commission were, in the long
run, more than adequately responded to and acted upon by the Government and
the Department of National Defence.
Mr. He liver and His_jfojLj^Ftanejrj^
Mr. Hellyer* s White Paper on Defence began innocently with the
following:
Saving stated the problem, the Royal Commission recommended the
gradual transfer of the executive control of common requirements
to the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee. In the opinion of the
government, this solution does not adequately resolve the basic
issues.
With this benign beginning to his now famous document, Mr. Hellyer continued
that Canada had to realign its defense thinking, both internally and internation-
ally. He desired a smaller force with better equipment and greater flexibility
so that they could be moved "quickly to meet emergencies anywhere in the
world ? "2 As in all military establishments, Mr. Hellyer was concerned with., the
wastes and faulty procurement procedures. 3
lie 1 Iyer, White Paper en Defence, p. 18.
^Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 21 February 1966, p. 1562,
3Senator William Proxmire, Re_por t from Wa s te land: Amer ica « s M i 1 1 -




Then Mr. He 1 Iyer introduced his sweeping concept of integration and
unification to the Government and to the Canadian people when he stated that
Following the most careful and thoughtful consideration,
the government has decided that there is only one adequate solu-
tion. It is the integration of the Armed Forces of Canada under
a single Chief of Defence Staff and a single Defence Staff. This
will bo the first step toward a single unified force for Canada.
The integrated control of ell aspects of planning and operations
should not only provide a more effective and coordinate defence
posture but should also result in considerable savings.
This paragraph caused the Government of Canada to come to a virtual halt as
the members of all parties reacted to the stunning announcement of the Govern-
ment. The press began its attack. The public began forming sides in what was
to become a six month battle. Mr. Hellyer led that battle; he led it well and
effectively and in the end was successful.
The man, Paul M. Hellyer, is an important element in the study, for
it was his personality and effort that ensured that integration and unification
became a reality, regardless of the public, governmental, or military pressures
exerted on him to the contrary. Mr. Hellyer's military background reveals that
he never reached a non-cc.-nmissioned officer rank although he served in two
wars in the Royal Canadian Air Force and the Canadian Army. Studies have
shown him to be a frustrated military man, anxious for the opportunity to
2
achieve some of the previously missed success in the military field.
He was a "difficult man to know."-* He refused to practice "the hearty arts of
phony comaraderie and gave all of those who came in brief contact with him an
Kellyer, V7Mte Paper on Defence B p. 18.
i^lcLin, (• Defence Policy, p. 197.
^Interview with Captain eth Hickford, Comptroller, Washington
Canadian Defence Liaison Staff, 8 February 1971.

impression of stand-offish pomposity. Eut beneath an itnperturable surface, he
was both personable and impassioned." 1 Much of his impassioned attitude is
2
said to have developed along with his religious zeal.
When he moved from a party back-bench seat to a Cabinet post, he
took "absolute charge when he was moved into the Defence Department activity."^
According to one disillusioned Admiral, he was "like some bush-league
McNamara."^
With his personality so difficult to understand and despite his
personable but subdued private characteristics, Mr. Hellyer's tactics, and
more particularly his brusque methods, met "with understandable resistance
5
from the members and ex-members of Canada's proud armed services*" What
caused much of the conflict with the public and members of Parliament was that
"he foisted the system of integration and unification on a filature society"
not actually prepared to accept such a radical departure in the defense
structure in view of the potential gains to be achieved. The public
questioned whether the project could be successfully completed without great
expense or without jeopardizing the existing defense posture.
Mr. Heilyer and his behind-the-scenes developer of the concept of









*Ibid. t p. 206.




William Lee of the Royal Canadian Air Force, continued to develop his pro-
gram. He began to act with a messiantic zeal, trying to accomplish a life's
mission regardless of the adverse reaction.
Reactions to Integration and Unif ication
Reactions to Mr. Hel Iyer's White. Pa per., on Defence began immediately
after it was tabled before Parliament. Former Prime Minister John Diefenbaker,
who had created the 1960 Royal Commission^on. Government Organisation , attacked
2
the bill from its inception. Others felt Mr. Hex Iyer had failed to learn the
lessons of history that a nation cannot have a viable single force structure.
Others reported that Mr. He 1 Iyer was "upset because he had to lean against the
defence structure of the United States and the United Kingdom" and that he
3
preferred to es -h Canada's own ability to defend itself. Even Prime
Minister Pearson took some humorous s at the unification bill. In 1966,
two years after the introduction of the bill, at an Albany Club speech n
Toronto he said that "the Pearson government would face a great lawsuit be*
cause the new green unified armed services dress was modeled on outfits worn
by Coca-Cola Company truck drivers."
Favorable reaction in concurrence with the goals of integration -
cams from the Chiefs of the three services who viewed the concept as an experi-
ment "in defence organization which other countries might, with profit, pro-
motc." ?+ Nine of Canada's allies, including the United States, established
5
study groups to evaluate and appraise the concept's relavance. The Canadian
government hoped that "the distinctive experiment in defence organisation
*Hickford Interview, 8 February 1971 5IMd., p. 5.
*Neuman, Coming of Pierre Ti u, p. 152.
3
Hickford Interview, 8 February 1971.
^Hamilton Sp r, 4 September 1965, p. 4.

24
could give a significance to its alliance contribution which its diminishing
relative strength was taking away," A spokesman from the Department of
Defense in the United States stated that any form of standardization in an
organisation is an excellent concept. "^
While there were pros and cons to the concept, all were sensibly
expressed both within the government and from the general public. However, one
of tho major disputes arising from the integration and unification program came
from within the Department of National Defence from the Royal Canadian Navy.
"Canada's naval forces were responsible for the fact that the only significant
opposition to the government's plans for integration occurred in the Navy, "3
In July 1966 the Commander and the Deputy Commander of the Maritime Command
"•left* office to protest what they regarded as excesses in the movement to-
ward a unified national defence force." Members of the other services were
equally expressive, although the senior officers s having learned from the
government's reaction to the Navy's outburts, on the whole remained silent.
Some reported that the move toward integration was nothing more than an "ex-
ercise in semantics" or that "only the names of the existing organizations
have been changed,"-*
One writer in a balanced statement on the conflict that was
raging throughout the country reported that
*IMd., p. 4.
2
McLin, Canad a's Changing Defence Policy , p. 199.
3 Ibid.» pp. 203-204.
^Toronto Globe and Mail , 22 July 1966 , p. 2.
^Hickord Interview, 8 February 1971.
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. * .opinion is split both within the government and
intellectual community. Some feel the military forces are
being cut too severly, far below levels prudent for national
security. Others believe Canada should sever all military
alliances. Among Canadian rank m\d file, the reaction tends
to be total indifference.*
Regardless of criticisms mounted against the integration and
unification bill, the debate began. 2 The Minister of National Defence, in
his argument In favor of unification as well as the development of the
country's own ability to maintain its defense structure, stated that "it does
increase our costs, but, at the same time. . .we are able to introduce
Canadian concepts, improvements, and adopt Canadian equipment, which has an
individual application as well."-' After months of tumultuous debate, the
bill was enacted and integration at the top management level was effected on
1 .July 1964.4 With the bill a law, it was predicted that "it may take a
generation (10=15 ) until today*s junior officers are in command positions














Parliament passed the integration and unification bill and it had to
be implemented. In order to effect successful change, there are a number of
unilateral managerial techniques that may be employed. First is to change by
decree. The second is by replacement of personnel. The third is through
^Powell, "Building a Fortress Canada?", p. 50.
Neuman, Coming of Pierre Trude.au
, pp. 408-409.
^Canada, House of Co: s Special
,
M
,SJ:udj.es^r d for the Special
Committee on t-f-^trtr?rs RelPtin,^ to Defence (Ottawa? Queen's Printer, 1965), p. 1076.
4yves E. Pinet, "Improved Budgeting and Programming in the United
States Department of Defense and C an Developments" (unpublished MBA Thesis,
The George Washington University, 1965), p. 2.
^Powell, "Building a Fortress Canada?", p. 53.
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structural change. 1 Certain aspects of all of these phases were employed by
Mr. He 1 Iyer in his implementation program. The change by decree came with
parliamentary approval of the radical bill. With the change of service concept
approved, Mr. Hellyer began replacing those individuals with whom he felt he
could not work or whom he did not trust in promoting the program. The Royal
Canadian Navy critically suffered, for Mr, Hellyer found that a majority of
the admirals wore against the program. He consequently suggested they resign.
Individuals acceptable to Mr. Hellyer filled the vacancies. In a similar manner
Mr. Hellyer' s organization began to change as the personnel were changed. As
Greiner wrote, ". . . revolutionary attempts are now being made to transform
organizations rapidly by altering the behavior and attitudes of line and staff
2
personnel at all levels of management." This was the course of action that
Mr. Hellyer was employing with the Defence establishment.
Throughout the initial course of integration and unification. Mr.
Hellyer personally undertook most of the action. However, other Greiner
management tecliniques of pressure and arousal in "which the power structure
3
is shaken at its very foundation" were employed. This unification bill pro-
vided an excellent study of the management techniques to be used to effect a
rapid and successful organizational change of major proportions. The
machinations of Mr. Hellyer illustrate that a successful manager must employ
all of the techniques available at the right time to ensure that change
is effective.
Larry E. Greiner, "Patterns of organization Change," Harvard
Business Review
, May-June 1967, pp. 120-126.
2Ibid.
. p. 120.
3 ):bid., p. 119.
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Mr. Heilyer had the management tools as well as the power to im-
plement: them. Some of the basic proposed changes to the military establishment
were originally outlined in the Glassco Commission report. The report acted as
the basic blueprint for the White Paper on Defence , the eventual plan for im-
plementing unification.
The Royal Commission on Government
i
Organisation stated that "the
first and most limited arrangements involve the assignment of responsibility
for a particular service, on a local basis, to the major user in the locality"
and that such a step would "yield significant gains in efficiency and
economy." 1 The second step "involves a general assignment of responsibility
to a single service, which may or may not be the major user,"^ In discussing
this approach further, the Commission wont on to report that "the integration
or consolidation of common functions can be attempted in three different ways,
the first being based en tl signment of operating responsibility to a single
service, the other two involving the removal of direction from direct control
of any individual service.""'
Following the suggested direction of the Glassco Commission, the
White Paper stated that after the bill was passed, "a unified command, eventu-
ally extending to all operational levels, must be established, followed by -the
adoption of a single uniform."4 On 1 August 1964 the first stage of integration
was accomplished with the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee position being
replaced by the Chief of Defence Staff, Vice Chief of Defence Staff, Assistant








^'cLin ? Changing Defence Policy , p. 1.98.
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Personnel j Logistics, and Engineering.*
The second step was the formation of six functional commands, a
reduction from eleven organized along service lines. This was begun in early
2
1966 and was completed by 1968.
Introducing a common terminology in the rank structure and the use
of a single uniform was the last step. This program was begun in 1968 and is
3
to be completed by the end of 1971.
"Greater standardisation of requirements and rationalisation of
supply. • .will yield significant economies."^ This was one of the major bene«
fits to be recognised with the implementation of the unification bill. The
most obvious areas of reductions were in civilian and military personnel. The
military population was immediately reduced over the years beginning in 1966
and continuing into 1970 toward the 82 e 000 officers and men objective with
savings in salaries of millions of dollars. A similar reduction in forcn was
undertaken in the civilan manpower structure."* "While the forces were beginning
to be reduced in size, the Department of National Defence began its program of
base consolidations and closures both in Canada and overseas to achieve immedi-
ate economies. Procurement contracts were allowed to lapse. New construction
was halted in all areas until a complete survey of facilities and capabilities
could be undertaken in line with new defense objectives. The logistics command
was organized to promote a single service concept. The defense budget was
politically frozen at $1.8 billion and Defence had to begin to operate within
a restricted budget for at least the next three years.
1 Debates, 21 February 1966, p. 1563.
bates , 17 February 1966, p. 1417.





While those organizational changes were being implemented, Defence
began a review of its policy under which the new service would operate until
1974. The Department, in organizing itself for execution of the defense pro-
grams, noted that there were two facts of prime significance:
1. Canadian defence arrangements do not envisage indpendent
military action by the forces of this country.
2. The forces used in meeting any major emergency must be
organized, equipped, and trained before the emergency arises.
Yet as far back as 1938, Prime Minister Mackenzie King reaffirmed the 1920
Opposition Leader's remarks that Canada faced no enemy of "a kind which con-
stituted a strategic threat to her security." However, Canada needed a defense
establishment tailored to her capabilities and commitments. "Military policy
concerns decisions of governments of members of state systems about their
military establishments, including the decision whether or not to maintain a
3
military establishment." Therefore, a military policy is an inescapable
function and to be a member of the state system is to have a military policy.
Thus, with integration and unification, the government began to review its
alliances abroad and its role within the nation. Any withdrawals from commit-
ments in NATO and its peacekeeping missions would be gradual. The reductions
within Canada were to be accomplished slowly over a period of years.
The gradual reductions and changes were being implemented when
the government changed. Lester Pearson was replaced by Prime Minister Pierre








. » .sweeping changes in national goals. Under the current
regime, priorities have be*:-n almost completely reversed, Whereas
international cooperation in mutual defence formerly :ed
first en the list, it has now moyed down the line, giving way to
the protection of national sovereignty and the use of the armed
forces to carry out a wide range of activites s ling. the
civil authorities and contributing to national development*
The current Chief of Defence Staff, General R. R. Sharp, stated that Canada's
move is "not one of getting out of Europe, but rather a change of emphasis
to internal problems that the present financial and political situations in
Canada dictate."*- Yet there are those observers who feel that the establish-
ment of Canada's sovereignty as the number one goal indicates there is a
retreat to * Fortress Canada' and the adoption of a Sweden-like foreign
policy of neutrality and isolation.-' Others feel that the Canadian military
establishment is "currently deprived of adequate strategic justification." 4
But the Chief of Defence Staff countered all critics of the present defense
policy und r the newly unified force structure in the followin. iri
Money that a country puts into defence is much the same
as money put into insurance. You don't want to use it., but it
is there if you need it. Insurance money, however, is always
productive, never idle, and military resources must always be
prepared to do the military job if needed. But, in the interim,
they fflust support the nation, not remain idle. This, of course,
increases their involvement in domestic issues.
For this reason, we in the Department of National Defence
should justify what we propose in terms of support of those
aims. . .or we should not exist.-'
Powell, "Building a Fortress Canada?", p. 50.
Ibid.
, p. Dl.
3Ibid. t p. 50.
Leach, Contemporary Canada, p. 232,




The continuous attempts begun in the 1950'$ to restructure tho
organization of the Canadian armed forces ended in 1966 with the implementation
of the integration and unification of the forces into a single service. The
Minister of National Defence, Paul M. Heliyer, encountered resistance from
the government, the Opposition, from within the military establishment, and
from the public regarding his proposal, a proposal initiated by the Glassco
Commission in its final recommendations. However, unification was passed by
Parliament and has been implemented throughout the armed forces. The savings
in dollars are difficult to evaluate since the budget has been frozen for
three years and inflation continues* There have been initial increased sosts
from implementing the new concept while maintaining part of the old not
offset by the dollar savings in personnel reduction and decrease in eqripment
purchases* The years ahead will be a period of refinement until the current
ten year plan expires or is renewed or replaced with the plan for the 70* s and
80's.
An overview in Chapter III of the development of the overall
Canadian government budgetary process and financial management techniques '
will complete the foundations for analysis of the effects integration and
unification have had on the Department of National Defence budget organi-
zation and budget development and submission procedures.

CHAPTER III
SURVEY OF THE CANADIAN BUDGET PRQCE I
Historical Development of Canadian Fiscal Folk^
Canada did not begin any serious attempt to examine its budget pro-
cedures or financial management practices until the early 1900' s.* Then, as
if the examination were caused by a natural embarrassment from the country's
failure to comprehend the close control of the budgetary and financial fields, a
concerted effort was undertaken to introduce, pass, and adopt new organization-
al laws and frameworks under which all phases of the country's finances would
2
come under close scrutiny from the executive and legislative bodies.
From the initial developments of Canada as an organized society, the
country was financially controlled almost singularly frcra Great Britain until
the British North America Act of 1867 under which Canada was granted confeder-
ation and the right to act individually without prior approval of governmental
3proposals from the British Crown. It was under this important act in
Canadian history that the first recognizable evidence of the development of
the Canadian budgetary system is formalized. The British North America Act
established a single Consolidated Revenue Fund for the centralized control of
Dawson, Canadian House of Commons
, pp. 32-91.
Neuman, Coming of Pierre Trudeau
, p. 42.
3C, C. Lingard, Canada: Cne Hundred 1867-1 967 (Ottawa: Queen's




revenues and expenditures in Canada. 1 In 1878 a further refinement increased
financial management control in the form of the Consolidated Revenue and Audit
Act, an act which strengthened the audit practices that had been virtually un-
2
changed since the British North America Act. It created the position of
Auditor General and made him responsible for expenditures from the Consolidated
Revenue Fund. This act was necessitated because votes, or appropriations, were
usually over-expended; expenditures were often charged to the wrong votes;
liabilities against the government were incurred without the approval of Parlia-
ment and were, at the same time, several years in advance of the formal approval
from Parliament; various other questionable practices were uncovered; and
growth in the size of the departments and agencies, unchecked by Parliament,
3induced over-expenditures. To correct several of these observed deficiencies,
Parliament in 1910 created the Treasury Board to review the estimates, or bud-
get requests>, and to assume the other related financial management responsibil-
ities.
There were? no further changes :.n the Canadian budgetary process
until 1951 during which time the Consolidated Revenue and Audit Act was re-
placed with the Financial Administration Act. This act strengthened and
clarified the roles and responsibilities of the Treasury Board and the Comp-
troller of the Treasury. This act has become the foundation of the present
*Glassco s P^oval Commission, p. 127.
2
I bid., p. 127.
3 Ibid., p. 127.




Canadian financial management and budgetary systems. It firmly establishes
the Treasury Board and the positions of Minister of Finance, Comptroller of
the Treasury, and Auditor General.
In 1955 in order to Increase its control over expenditures, the
government asked the Minister of Finance to establish a special committee to
"consider estimates as may be referred to it and to report from time to time
its findings and recommendations to the House. 1" In a continuing move to in-
crease its fiscal controls, the House of Commons in 1958 organized and approved
the creation of a standing committee to examine proposed expenditures. However,
this committee had no power to determine who would be called to testify before
it and has, in recent years, become less powerful than when originally con-
ceived.
Organization of the BiR'not S yst' a
Canada *s significant budgetary and financial management positions
are the Minister of Finance, the Comptroller of the Treasury, the Auditor
General, and the senior staff member of Treasury board. (See Figure 1 --- The
Organization of the Canadian Financial Management and Budget Control Depart-
ments and Agencies, p. 35*) The Minister of Finance is a member of the Prime
Minister's Cabinet, a member of Parliament, and is responsible for the develop-
ment of his department's fund requests as well as for the policy formulations
within the Cabinet framework. At the same time, the Minister of Finance holds
an equally important position as the Chairman of the Treasury Board, an
organization composed of six Cabinet ministers who, technically, as Ministers
Dawson, Cana 6 i e.n I ou s e of Commons , pp. 217-223.
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of the Crown, act collectively as advisors to the Governor General as the
Executive in the Canadian parliamentary system of government.
It is traditional for the Minister of Finance to review the financial
condition of the country at least once a year. After his budget speech to the
House of Commons, there follows a parliamentary debate limited to eight days
during which time the House of Commons becomes a committee of the whole. When
resoltuions are proposed, the government introduces amending bills through
2
normal channels.
The Treasury Board establishes the fiscal policies for the govern-
ment's implementation, develops fund requirements and expenditures, and con-
3
trols fund collections. The Executive is responsible for the proper execution
of the approved programs passed by Parliament. In reality, the Treasury Board
is part of the collective responsibility of the Cabinet with the day-to-day
operations of the Treasury Board being submitted to the Treasury Board Staff.
The Treasury Board Staff undertakes consideration and approval of proposals for
funds made by the departments and agencies of the government within a certain
determined dollar limitation, The Treasury Board in addition issues regulations,
gives direction, and delegates authority to the various departments and
agencies.
The Comptroller of the Treasury is an officer in the Department of
Finance. He is responsible for the enforcement of financial decisions of
Parliament, the Executive, end She Treasury Board. > In difficult fiscal matters,
Ibid.
, p. 129.
2 Ihid. » p. 130.
3




the Comptroller may request direction from Treasury Board and in turn may be
overruled by Treasury Board on an appeal from a department minister.* Dele-
gated to the Comptroller by the Minister of Finance is the responsibility for
maintalrdng central accounts of the government, preparing annual Public
Accounts, and holding certain cash management functions.
It was the Financial Administration Act of 1951 that established
as one of the responsibilities of the Auditor General the examination of
accounts relating to the Consolidated Revenue Fund to ensure its reliability
and accuracy ,*• Annually, the Auditor General must report his findings to Par-
1 lament.
Canadian Bud ' ry Cycle
The Canadian fiscal year ends 31 March. But before that date, the
Minister of finance tables the coming fiscal year expenditure program before
Parliament in the form of Estimates, main and supplemental, which have been
developed by his staff and the Treasury Board in working conjunction with the
departments and agencies. (See Figure 2 ... Chronology of Estimates and Expend-
itures for a Fiscal Year, p.. 38.) Debate on the Estimates is generally re-
stricted, for the government has approved the budget in principal, and the
only opposition comes in the form of questions from the other parties. Once
debate is concluded;, Parliament approves the Estimates through enactment of the
appropriations acts. The Estimates that are submitted to Parliament are not
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one or more votes covering several functions or activities of the department.
The intent of the vote is based on the narrative description that accompanies
the Estimate. This is unique in that it prevents a veto from withholding all
funds for a departmental appropriation while other votes from the department
are being considered. Each of the votes governs the subsequent expenditure in
two ways. First, the dollar limit mentioned in the narrative of the vote cannot
be exceeded. Secondly, all expenditures must conform to the limits prescribed
by the wording of the vote.
Before Parliament enacts legislation regarding the Estimates, the
Committee of Supply must first approve each vote by separate resolution and
2
must question the appropriate minister as advised by his senior officials.
The Committee of Supply rarely disapproves a vote in the Estimates since the
entire budget was previously approved by the Cabinet sitting as the Executive.
ice the parliamentary system permits the fail of the government in po
because of a lack of confidence in a money bill, it behoves the party in power
to ensure that all aspects of its budget are considered before presentation to
Parliament. After the Committee of Supply has approved the reasons for the re-
quests for funds, the Estimates and votes are forwarded to the Committtee for
Ways and IJeans, which then passes resolutions appropriating money out of the
3
Consolidated Revenue Fund to cover the expenses for public services.
The approval of the Estimates requires only assent by the House of
Co-.mons, for in Canada the Senate, the upper house, has no reviewing powers.
After the two committees have taken action, the Estimates are sent to the House
IMjck, p. 130.
Pinet, "Improved Budgeting and Programming," p. 75.
J IMd, s p. 75.
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of Commons, which approves the appropriations bills, normally following the
wording and the amounts used in the Estimates. Should Parliament not have
approved the appropriations bills prior to the start of the new fiscal year,
the House of Commons will pass interim funding bills until the Parliament has
had the opportunity to act on the new Estimates.* Funds become available only
when the bills are given Royal Assent by the Governor General or his deputy.
After Royal Assent has been received, the appropriation bill becomes
law and the money is provided to the Executive to be spent according to the
2discretionary powers stated in the bill. The responsibility for the spending
of the funds does not lay with the Cabinet minister but with the Executive as
a whole. The departments and agencies administer the funds in accordance with
procedures established by the Treasury Board and Auditor General. (See Figure
3 --- Summary of the Expenditure Process in Government, p. 41.) Thus, the
Executive must follow the expenditures as approved since each member of the
Executive is also a member of Parliament. Certain additional funds are pro-
vided to the Governor General to meet certain national expenses when Parlia-
ment is not sitting.
Effect of the Glassco Commission ..on Financial Policy
An historical review of the development of Canadian financial
policies illustrated the responsibilities of the Department of Finance and its
staff positions. These positions and functions have remained virtually un-
changed as a result of the recommendations of the Glassco Commission. The bud-
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organizational concepts that the Commission challenged. Instead, it asserted
that financial policies and administration within the departments could be
effectively strengthened to ensure proper financial management of available
resources. The Commission was "critical of the Government for the lack of
long range plans and objectives and adequate and meaningful financial controls
in the departments. "*•
With respect to budgeting, the Commission recommended that the
Estimates should be prepared by programs and activities. It also recommended a
significant degree of decentralization of authority for financial management
from the central agency, i. e., the Treasury Board down to the departments and
through all levels of the departments counterbalanced by a system of responsi-
bility accounting. Departmental officers could then be held accountable for
their stewardship of this decentralized authority for management of funds.
What in fact was recommended by the Glassco Commission and has now
been accepted by the government as policy is a system of Program Budgeting and
Responsibility Accounting, practices whici have proved successful in industry.
The Treasury Board Staff with the assistance of management consultants undertook
to develop a Government Financial Management Manual establishing guidelines
for a new Canadian financial management concept applicable to all of the depart-
ments and agencies. Some of the important objectives are:
1. To show the nature of programs being carried out by each
department and the activities making up each program so that those
in authority, by knowing the purpose for which funds are being re-
quested, will be in a better position to establish priorities and
to decided on the most effective allocation of funds or other




£. J. Benson, "Financial Manag< ent in Departments and Agencies of
the Government of Canada" (Ottawa: Queen*s Printer, 1967), pp. 1-5.
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2. To bring together as many of the costs associated with a
with a given activity or program as is practicable so that those in
authority can weigh prospective benefits against related costs and
can estimate the effect of a cutback or expansion.
3, To facilitate the planning and control functions of
departmental management by providing a means of assessing the
effect of changes in demands for services and thus in the level of
activity or funds needed to finance a given program.
A. To improve financial management within departments by
identifying individual accountability whenever practicable for
estimating and controlling of revenues and expenditures associ-
ated wi fch a particular program.
5. To assess the performance of accountable officers at
every level of management in departments in their management of
the program concerned.*-
>nce, the Glassco Commission made recommendations with the
government determining their validity and ordering their implementation. The
Treasury Beard was given the responsibility for developing the recommendations
into - Le tools and guidelines for the departments. What resulted vas a
manual devoted to all aspects of the financial management question. For this
thesis, only the area of budget preparation, reporting, and control as detai
by the Treasury Board in its manual will be examined, for this area directly
affected the budget organization and budget development process of the Depart*-
ment of National Defence.
Th» Revised Budget Preparation, Reporting, and Control, Process
The Treasury Board manual states that in order for managers to be
able to v.: rge all of their responsibilities, they require authority to
spend funds under an approved budget. To be held accountable for this manage-
ment, their performance must be measured against the approved budget. Conse-
quently, tha first step necessary to achieve this financial management goal is
* Ibid., pp. 7-11.
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to prepare the budget and have It approved. However, the budget is only useful
for management if periodic reports are prepared comparing the actual with- the
planned performance. To ensure that this will be achieved, the Treasury Board
manual recommends that certain controls be implemented to gain a balance be-
tween the responsibilities and authorities given to the line manager and those
retained by senior management.
After the Canadian government has developed its goals and objectives
to be achieved for the coming fiscal year, these long-range and certain short-
range plans must be translated into a budget by the manager with a view to
estimating their needs for per L, facilities, and funds. Budgets of this
type will fall into three general categories; the operations and maintenance
budget, the working capital budget, and the budget for grants and specie 1 funds.
In budget preparation, management has certain responsibilities that
have been established by the Treasury Board to comply with the recommendations
of the Gisssco Commission. The actual bud, ist be prepared at the lorest
level of responsibility and become progressively consolidated as it "pyramids
upwards through the levels of management,
"
1 To enable lower management to pre-
pare their facets of the budget, they must have a clear understanding of the
departmen lis and objectives* both long-range and short-range.
Once these goals and objectives have been classified, detailed plans
have to be developed in order to specify the required numbers and classifica-
tions of personnel, equipment, materials, supplies, and other resources. These
physical units must then be expressed in dollars. To achieve these dollar units,
tha Treasury Board manual requests thats




centre where the expenditure is made.
. 2. As budgets are developed through the managerial pyramid,
costs are accumulated by responsibility centre rather than by ob-
jectives of expenditure.
3. The accuracy of supporting data is essential for the
activities to be carried out.
4. Fixed and variable costs be shown separately where it
would be advantageous.
5. Managers attempt to predict as accurately as possible
the time of the year in which the expenditure will be made.
6. The reasons for cash requirement differences be noted
in the budget request.
7. The commitment authority for special projects be de-
tailed to permit Parliament to know the initial as well as the
long-range costs of special capital projects.
8. Flexible budgeting be considered in many areas of
departmental budget requests.
9. The manpower requirement for numbers of positions be de-
termined through the budgets examined during the est' review,
and for classification and pay* through the system of personnel
management.
After the budget has been prepared, it is sent to the manager's
supervisor for acceptance and from there, after consolidation with other bud-
gets, to higher levels of management. Usually a senior budget official within
the department should review the budget and recommend and changes prior to its
being submitted to the Treasury Board.
The Treasury Board notes that operations under an "approved budget
2
will likely show that actual expenditures vary from estimated expenditures."
When this occurs, the Treasury Board will recommend that management take action
to alter its operations according to the nature of the variances. Managers are
to be given maximum freedom to offset deficiencies and surpluses in their
hbid., pp. 20-21.
2 Ibid., p. 21.
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budgets if this will correct the situation and achieve the job objective,
provided the total budget is not exceeded and the manager remains within his
area of responsibility. The manager will then have to account for the vari»
ances from the original plan* However, should a change in a budget result from
a change in the overall plan, then the budget should be adjusted to reflect the
new situation.
In the Canadian system, each department produces two kinds of re-
ports. The first is for department managers. The second is for Parliament and
2the Executive. These reports, according to the Treasury Board Manual, should
meet certain sta >j accuracy of results, accountability, comparability of
actual versus planned results, promptness of submission of the report to en-
sure time for corrective actions consistency of the presentation of the results
for all levels of management from one period to another; and simplicity so that
the results are clearly presented in a concise manner with the least amount of
detail *
Ths objectives of management information through standard reporting
procedures for budget development should bej
1. To provide a control over operations, and in conjunction
with workload analysis, to show the extent to which approved plans
are being carried out.
2. To facilitate the management of funds at all times and to
show the need for supplementary estimates or adjustments of alloca-
tions.
3. To provide a basis for the preparation of the next year's
estimates.
4. To facilitate the review of plans and priorities.3
To implement this system of reporting, the Treasury Board has noted





3 IMd., p. 22.
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that "in a good reporting system, separate reports become progressively con-
solidated as they pyramid upwards."* Consequently, it is stressed that every
effort be made to establish clear lines of reporting responsibility and to main*
tain those lines so that the effective consolidation of reports can continue
to provide only significant data necessary for departmental as well as govern-
mental decision-makir
"As an organization grows larger, it becomes necessary to delegate
managerial duties to lower levels, even though senior management retains com-
plete responsibility." 2 Thus, the controls created ensure that budget prepara-
tion and budget reporting are accurate and correctly reflect the current status
of the department. As in developing a budget, goals must also be established
for financial control. They should include:
1. Achieving a high degree of responsiveness to local conditions,
and the flexibility to adjust to changing conditions and unforeseen de-
velopments within approved programs.
2* Simplifying adminsitration generally and reducing paperwork
and delay by delegating authority for decisions to the lowest possi-
ble level.
3. Placing responsibility at the level where control is most
effective and on officers who can be held accountable for the results.
4. Fostering a greater sense of financial responsibility and
awareness of the fin t! implications of management decisions at
the local level.
5. Encouraging active participation by senior personnel in the
financial management of their programs.
6. Providing an environment that will encourage and assist
managers to make the most effective use of available resources.
7. Assuring senior management that the organization is moving





I p i d
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p. 24.
3 lbid.» p. 24.
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The development of the budget and reporting of expenditures under
that budget are two ways of controlling funds. Since the Glassco Commission,
the government and the Treasury Board have adopted the policy that once a depart-
ment is given an approved budget from Parliament, a manager should also be given
the greatest possible freedom to spend within the budget. Control should be
achieved by monitoring performance and not by "restricting freedom to act."
Thus, spending authority for approved funds should be allocated down through
the organisation in the same manner in which the budget was consolidated. In
delegating this spending authority, financial accountability will be maintained
only if all managers recognize that they are accountable for their performances
to their supervisors; if the delegated authorities are communicated simply and
directly to all levels of management by policies, procedures, regulations, and
manuals of instruction, all of which should be kept up to date; and if both
the person delegating authority and the recipient understand the nature and
extent of the delegation that has taken place and the means of control that
will be used.
Another method of control is the pre-audit. Under the British North
America Act, no payment can be made out of the Consolidated Revenue Fund without
the authority of Parliament. Authority is given through the annual appropri-
ations, resulting from the submitted departmental budgets, and through the
Financial Administration Act, x?hich provides the major part of the legal basis
for the financial control in the government. Under present law, the Comptroller
of the Treasury conducts the pre-audit, designed to ensure that:
1. Expenditures are charged to the proper vote and allotment.





3. Relevant statutory authorities, all regulations and
directives, as well as departmental rules and regulations, are
observed*
4. Mathematical accuracy of requisitions for payment,
evidenced by supporting vouchers, is verified.*
The Treasury Board thus oversees all departmental expenditures to
"ensure that the rules of Parliament, the central control agencies, and the
2departments themselves are obeyed." However, the Glassco Commission found
that the audit functions, particularly the pre-audit function, "resulted in an
excessive amount of repetitive checking that tended to dilute the sense of
responsibility in the department and recommended that these responsibilities
•a
be transferred to the departments." The Treasury Board is currently reviewing
these recorimendations to prevent a collapse of the financial controls
established*
The vot^ structure itself imposes elements of control. The manner
in which programs by activities are divided into votes is dictated by the needs
of parliamentary review and control. Host programs in Canada contain both
operating and capital expenditures. Many also have one major transfer payment
of grants and subsidies. These, three elements are important on a government-
wide basis. Trends in operating costs should not be obscured by the year-to-year
fluctuations that occur in capital programs. In addition, Parliament and the
Executive have a special interest in the effect of capital programs on the
economy and the flexibility to adjust these programs to respond to economic
circumstances.
The Glassco Commission found that it was not necessary to divide









the votes into the three separate budget requests of operations and mainten-
ance, capital, and grants and subsidies and others. Instead, they recommended
that the votes be 'netted 1 or combined together. According to the Commission,
vote netting would "provide management v?ith greater incentive to improve ser-
vice and to collect the revenues generated; allov a department to adjust its
services to meet changes in demand; and provide a clear test of the real im-
portance the public attaches to the service as evidenced by their willingness
to pay. ltJ" it the Treasury Board noted certain disadvantages to the vote net-
ting system, such as curtailment of a program or activities because of;
1. Short-fall in anticipated revenues.
2. Delay in receipt of monies for services provided.
3. Restrictions on available funds in the early part of the
year when expenditures are being incurred but revenues have not yet
been granted.
The Treasury Board has accepted the recommendations of the Glassco Commission
regarding vc te netting but has not established a general policy to be adopted
by the departments and agencies.
Summary;
Financial amangement practices of the Canadian government have
evolved slowly throughout Canada's 100 year history. After the 1900' s, a con-
certed revision of existing policies and practices vras undertaken to strengthen
control of finances. The existing financial establishment, consisting of the
Minister of Finance, the Treasury Board, the Comptroller of the Treasury, and
the Auditor General, has not been significantly changed in recent years
although certain of their functions have been modified to reflect current
"Glassco, Royal. Co-mission
, pp. 62-63.
Benson, Financial Management i n Canada, p. 29.
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financial management trends. The budgetary cycle remains unchanged.
However* the Glassco Commission, having investigated the financial
management status of the government and its departments and agencies, noted
weaknesses in budget development and control. The government adopted these
recommendations and the Treasury Board was assigned the responsibility for
ensuring implementation throughout the government. The detailed study of
budget preparation and reporting presented a view of budget development that
had to be adopted by the Department of National Defence.
Based upon the foundation provided by the surveys of the
development of unification and integration of the armed forces and the
increased" financial management control initiated by the Glassco Commission,
Chapter IV will evaluate the effects of these concepts on the defense
organization and its budget development procedures.

CHAPTER IV
UNIFICATION AND THE ROYAL COMMISSION: THEIR EFFECT ON THE
DEFENSE ORGANIZATION AND BUDGETARY PROCESS
Introduction
Integration and unification forced organizational change on the
Department of National Defence. Since 196S, the Canadian Armed Forces has been
"suffering growing pains of a completely unified defence establishment as well
as the restructuring of its forces to a concept of high mobility*" Inflation
has been increasing and the Department of National Defence is restricted to a
fixed annual defense budget of $1.8 billion until 1971 « The forces have already
been reduced from pre- integration and unification levels in 1963 of 124,000 to
98,000. StilJ to be reduced are 16,000 military and 5000 civilians to achi«
an overall strength of 82 5 000 military and 30,000 civilians. While the De-
partment of National Defence has been enduring these organisational changes,
it had to respond to the recommendations of the Glassco Commission affecting
the dep nt*s budget policies, practices, and organization. The Commission
noted that there was a need to improve the financial management controls within
the department.
It was fortunate that the move toward integration and then full
unification coincided with the Glassco Commission report, for the objectives
of increasing effectivess and efficiency were compatible. Those aspects
owell, "Building a Fortress Canada?", p. 50.
2Ibid,
, p. 50.
-'Canada, Department of National Defence, Office of the Comptroller-




of integration and unification and Canadian financial management, which have
been previously surveyed, formed the foundations on which the Defence organiza-
tion approached these two concepts. The unification of the three services under
a single Chief of Defence Staff and the reorganization of the force structure
were exceedingly "propitious and enabled the development of a single Defence
Program within the context of Planning-Programming-Budgeting System."*
e introduction of Planning-Programming-Budgeting System (PPBS)
into the defense system was a compatible undertaking, for the system would
2function within the current governmental budgetary system. The Glassco
Comramission noted that PPDS "acts as a means of providing all levels of manage-
ment with 'targets or objectives so that performance of each may be measured."
PPBS also provides a check on "the efficiency with which available resources,
material or .utrnan, are used . . . the explosive growth in scale of government
expenditures necessitates the adoption of modern and efficient management
methods, similar in many aspects to business." \vhile the Canadian military
establishment is small, it permits the development of a less complex and
formal set of procedures for improving effectiveness and efficiency.
Defence Budget, Development Prior to rn i fi cation
rior to 1964, financial management and military planning in each
of the three services were treated as independent activities. The first "fall-
ing within the province of the comptrollers of each service and the second
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brought together by the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee." 1 The
Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff was responsible for coordinating the military
plans of the services although he did not possess executive authority but merely
acted as an advisor to the Minister of National Defence and coordinated ef-
forts of the armed forces toward fulfillment of the department's objectives.
These plans, done in terms of objectives of expenditures, e. g., military pay,
construction, operations, were projected for one year. Consequently, military
planning and budgeting were on completely different levels. Military plans were
prepared largely without regard to resource constraints and costs of these
plans were always far in excess of the budgets the government was willing to
grant. There were in reality a compilation of unilateral service plans rather
than any attempt to present a unified defense plan. To a great extent the order
of priority of forces, weapons systems, and activities was left to each military
service. Therefore, imbalances existed in the overall defense program.
At the same time that each sc^rv ice was preparing its current one
year budget request, it also prepared its own five-year program, which reflected
the commitments and requirements for each year. Collectively, these programs
were known as the «Mark Document,* which was submitted to the Chiefs of Staff
Committee for review. This document described the annual requirements of each
service xn terms of manpower, major equipment and money. However, the 'Mark
Document* was plagued with defects of unrealistic service demands. After the
•Mark Document' was reviewed by the military chiefs, it went to the Deputy
Minister of National Defence and to the Treasury Board Staff. The results of"
these reviews were transmitted to the Minister who in consultation with the
Treasury Board, derived the budget for the next fiscal year. Another problem
Comptroller-General Critique, February 1971, p. 1.
2Pinet, "Improved Budgeting and Programming, " p. 79.
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of the •Mark Document 1 was that it never received official sanction. There-
fore, it could not be used as authority for any action or as the sole and
basic tool for preparing the annual estimates. Since there was no official
sanction, there was no effort made to maintain the document in an up-to-date
posture. Postponement, reduction, and cancellations were not incorporated into
the document. "A philosophy of trying again next year was frequently practiced,
resulting in an unrealistic backlog of projects awaiting a more favourable
political climate for resubmission." These plans therefore tended to be sub-
stantially beyond the level likely to be achieved. Although the document gave
the impression cf long-range planning, it was prepared from the beginning each
year and tended to represent service hopes rather than feasible plans in terms
of available resources. Thus, under the pre-unif ication system, defense plans
and programs received official sanction and became the basis for action only
in re far hey were reflected in the parliamentary approved estimates.
The gap between military planning and the actual dollar resources
available for budgeting left the Minister of National Defence and the govern-
ment with "no alternative but to cut-back military programs each year in the
3
course of budget review." The choices and decisions in forces and weapons
systems by each individual service had to be made without adequate information
as to their future cost implications or their cost effectiveness relationships
in terms of the missions they were designed to perform. Budget review had to
be completed within a few weeks. Consequently, budget cuts were not often sys-
tematically reviewed. Thus, decisions with long-range resource implications
were often made prematurely under pressure from the separate service or without
* Ih id«, p. //.
2 Xbid r , pp. 80-81.
^Comptroller-General Critique, February 1971, p. 1.
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adequate consideration of all the major alternatives. The limited tine for
decisions often led to over-commitment. Later these decisions frequently "re-
sulted in uneconomical program 'stretch-outs' or the outright cancellation of
projects on which large sums had already been invested."
There was an obvious need for a single, integrated program data
system %?hich would serve to keep management informed about the full cost of its
decisions or options and about the current status of the defense program, both
in terms of its various mission capabilities and in its entirety. If needed,
timely corrective action could be undertaken. For this it was clear that better
cost data, better cost control, and better financial management techniques
would be required. It was the acceptance by Defence of these facts along with
the recommendations of the Glassco Commission that led to the decision to move
toward full unification of the budget organ ization in conjunction with the
direction of Treasury Board toward "the introduction of the concept of manage-
ment referred to as Planning-Programming-Budgeting System, and associated with
it, the Responsibility Accounting System." 2
Organization of the Unified De fence Budget Office
The development of the budget for the Department of National Defence
since unification and the recommendations of the Glassco Commission rests with
the Comptroller-General branch of the Canadian Forces Headquarters, Ottawa. The
organization is composed of the Comptroller-General, normally a Brigadier
General; a Deputy Comptroller-General; a Director General Organization and Man-







Benson, Financial Management in Canada, p. 30.
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of the Defence Budget Office Since Unification, p. 58.)
The responsibilities of the Director General Finance include pay
services, mess and institute funds, cost studies, automated systems, and
financial arrangements and management. 1 Within the office of the Director Gen-
eral Finance are five directorates: Director Budget, Director Financial Manage-
ment, Director Costing and Financial Arrangements, Director Pay Services, and
Director Automated Systems. The Director of Costing and Financial Arrangements
is a small operation of about 25 officers with specialised training in mathe-
matics and statistics. The office has two functions. It acts as a service
bureau for other headquarters directorates In the matters of costing and pro-
vides the functional commands with assistance on matters relating to costs. The
office is interested in preparing accurate past and forecast costing and in the
2
techniques of developing and using new cost factors. The objectives oi the
office are to produce costs for planning purposes, for recovery purposes, for
developing man-year costs of the forces for inclusion in the annual estimates,
and for producing cost data to answer numerous queries raised in the House of.
Commons, The financial arrangements section of the office was initiated as a
result of the increasing complexity of the Canadian Armed Forces operations
conducted inconjunction with other nations' military forces. Thus, this section
is responsible for the financial aspects of agreements with other countries and
their forces as well as for various financial arrangements within Canada.
The Directorates of Budget and Financial Management complement each
other. In examining these two directorates which are responsible for the devel-
opment of the Defence budget, their responsibilities will be studied in terms
*Giassco, Royal Commission, p. 67.
2Canada, Department of Rational Defence, Canadian Forces School of
Management Brief on Unification and the Budget, March 1969, p. 4.
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of the Defence budget cycle and its relationship to the previously surveyed
Canadian budget cycle.
The De fenc e Budget Cyc 1
e
In Hay the Director of Budget requests the various responsible
directorates of headquarters and material command to submit first draft esti-
mates detailing their requirements for the forthcoming fiscal year. (See
Figure 5 — - Defence Budget Cycle Since Unification, p. 60.) The estimates are
prepared based on past experience and the status of anticipated revenues. They
are in line the detailed *Intc Defence Program,' a document which
replaced the 'Mark Document* following unification of the three services.
E^timatea must be forwarded to the Dix*ector Budget by 1 August. His
office then consolidates the estimate?;. The total is co:/< with the predeter«
mined maxim. tount which cannot be exceeded . The Comptroller-General and the
Director Budget are informed of the budget ceiling imposed by the Minister of
Finance on direction from the Cabinet. Currently, that budget ceiling is
politically frosen at $1.8 billion. The estimates usually exceed the maximum
authorised, so it then becomes necessary to review the estimates and determine
areas in which reductions can be effected. During the month the estimates are
critically reviewed by the Comptroller-General and the service staff officers,
ptember the Defence budget is submitted to the Deputy Minister
of National Defence Staff with representatives of the Comptroller-General»s
staff present. After all problems are corrected and the review approved, the
estimates go to the Department of National Defence Review Committee in October.
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Chief of Defence Staff, the Chief of Technical Services, th*> Chief of Person-
nel, the Comptroller-General. Members of the Treasury Board are present both
at the Deputy Minister Review and the review by the Department of National
Defence Estimates Review Committee so that they will become familiar with the
proposed estimates in detail. When the budget has reached this stage of devel-
opment, the budget figures are in acceptable amounts, They are then developed
into book form and forwarded to the Treasury Board
,
Throughout the month of December the Treasury Board reviews the
budget estimates for Defence. In January a letter from the Treasury Board will
be sent to Defence stating that the estimates have been accepted and approved
in principal, although the letter may restrict certain urograms or request a
stop on a program until specific higher approval is rec jived. This letter indi-
cates that the Department of National Defence is ready :o proceed with the new
fiscal year's programs even though the estimates have n:>t been presented to
Parliament. The actual debate on the defence estimates -akes place after the
fiscal year has started.
It is at this stage that the Director of Financial Management assumes
the responsibility, for it is the function of that office to manage the current
fiscal year funds. The office first breaks down the $1.8 billion budget into
votes, which are broad categories. Then each vote is further subdivided into
accounting primaries. These in turn are further subdivided into objects of
expenditures, which is the lowest level at which funds may be managed. When this
project is completed, the funds are released to the various treasury offices
throughout Canada. Each expenditure will then be coded as to vote, primary, and
objective for expenditure with a consolidated monthly machine listing of
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expenditures forwarded to the Director oi: Financial Management by the chief
treasury officer. The expenditure run is closely monitored, for it forms the
basis of the monthly forecast prepared for the Deputy Minister of what will be
spent through the end of the current fiscal year. From this forecast, decisions
are made as to whether Defence should increase or decrease its spending. This
procedure will eventually be replaced with the Defence Programs and Responsibil-
ity Accounting Systems.
After Parliament has debated the bills and approved the appropria-
tions, the defense budget has reached its final stage for the current fiscal
year. There will be control aspects employed to ensure that the department
adheres to Parliament* s budget objectives for Defence.
Adoption of PPBS in the E ©fence Budget Cycle
To comply with the directives of Treasury Board and to meet the
requirements imposed by unification, Defer ce employed in 1966 a management
consulting firm, assisted by several officers, to develop a concept of financial
management practices to achieve the Giassco Commission objectives and then fco
supervise implementation. The objective of the study was to determine what steps
were necessary to implement the Treasury Board directives of responsibility
centers and accounting data. (See Figure 6 -«- Responsibility and Activity
Accounting for Defence Budget Development, p. 63.) In the preparation of the
future years* budget estimates, each responsibility center will have a clearly
defined objective and will determine its budget in terms of resources required
to achieve the assigned objective of manpower, premises, i. e., buildings,
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be challenged at each level up the chain of command and will together form the
command budget and, when consolidated with other commands' budgets, will form
the defense est .Standard cost modules will be used for direct costing,
other cost for capital and for fixed expenditures. Spending would be recorded
on standard forms broken down into costs and variances to show deviations be-
tween planned and actual estimates. (See Figure 7 »-» Defence Responsibility
and Activity Accounting Pyramind, p. 65.)
But implementation and direction toward FPBS were not simple. Before
PPBS was considered, it was said that "management philosophy and procedures
which were suitable to meet yesterday 5 s needs cannot adequately cope with to=
day's defence problems &v.d those of the future."* The Giassco Commission looked
at the former budget system and noted that it was "inadequate for efficient
management and was of limited value for planning and control, adversely effec-
9
ting review of the estimates by Treasury Board."
Tu meet the challenge of a growing and complex defense effort, the
Deputy Minister formed a 'Defence Program working Group' to establish a defense
programming system suitable for meeting the current and future needs of the
Department of National Defence. The group started mooting in November 1963 and
3began what evolved into PPBS for Canada based on a study of Hitch's works.
The Canadian system was cast in the same mold, except for deviations necessi-
tated by a different political and organizational environment, of that of the
United States PPB system. PPBS must be adaptable to the environment in which it
is expected to function. In the large-scale and complex Department of National
Defence, PPBS is & dynamic management function. To remain viable v the system
.' inet. "Improved Budgeting and Programming," p. 82.
2Giassco, Royal Commission
, p. 72,
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must bo flexible and provide for changes from policy decisions affecting defence,
availability of funds, planning of procurement programs, and manpower level
changes. It must consider the long-range and short-range effects on the mili-
tary activities.
Thus the goals of FIBS in the Canadian military establishment were
basically defined when the Minister of National Defence Hellyer issued his
White Paper on Defence in which he discussed, indirectly, a management system
for the armed forces.
It is intended to introduce into the Department of National
Defence a management system for planning and controlling major defence
programs at the departmental level. This system will display various
components of the long-term defence program in suitable detail over
a significant period of tine, The system will provide a means of ex-
pressing various force structures, weapon systems, logistics arrange-
nts, and other military activities in terms of their immediate and
long-range costs.
The main objectives of the system ares
1. To assist top management in the department in decision-
making ty providing the means of analysing and assessing various
militar nd activities in terms which will relate mili-
tary effectiveness to financial costs, manpower requirements,
equipment needs and other.
2, To provide the type of data which will enable the effects
of defence decisions to be c!ca.rly expressed in terms of forces,
manpower, equipment * and money both in the short-term and over a
period of years.
For this purpose, the total Canadian defence structure will
be grouped into a number of major programs. These programs will
cover ail arms of the services and will be expressed in terms of
major military missions or objectives. Each program will be
analyzed in appropriate detail to reflect the military and civilian
manpower, the major equipment, and the anticipated costs that are
programed over a period of years for the various elements of the
program. Projections of each will be reviewed annually.
This system will enable Defence Programs to be examined and




the standpoint of achieving a particular mission. It is hoped that
the system will enable defence resources to be allocated to Defence
Programs in the most effective manner from a view point of ultimate
military output and in accordance with a clear and detailed plan.*
By 1965 there were some noticeable weaknesses in the system pro-
posed by the committee. The system did not entail a comprehensive, long-term
defense program approved by the Minister to be developed into a tool for
coordinating the planning and budgetary processes. That system did not pro-
vide a systematic procedure for the preparation and review of national secur-
ities policies at a level above the Minister of National Defence. There was
no common frame of reference within which programs or amendments could be
evaluated within the context of the overall defense program." There was not
enough data available for decision-making. It did not bridge the gap between
planning and budgeting. It did not form the only authorised basis for prepara-
tion of the estimates since it was impossible to translate the cost of program
elements for the next fiscal year into budgetary appropriation formate It
did not reflect and evaluate long-term effects of budgetary reductions or
other decisions imposed from above and there vas no follow through in the
system. Another weakness was that there was a need for the defense effort to
3be expressed in terms of missions to be accomplished.
In review, it is evident that there were significant failings in the
proposed system of PPB as originally conceived by the committee. After an
evaluation of the system in effect in 1965, additional corrective recommenda-
tions were made. The recommendations for an improved PPB system were for it-
to "provide a means of reflecting long-term effects of decisions, such as bud-
get cuts, postponement of projects or procurement, imposition of manpower
Hellyer, White Paper on Defence, p. 20.
"?inet, "Improved Budgeting and Programming," pp. 83-85.
"' Ibi d., pp. 83-55.
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ceilings, in terms of specific programs over a specified period of time."*
Another new objective of the system would be that "the effects of today's
decisions on future activities could be daily identified and written into
the detail of the long-term program. The programming could be done on a
9
realistic basis." Changes to approved programs could be initiated from lower
levels within certain parameters established for approval. Annual review of the
programs to reflect the approved changes as well as implementing policy changes
resulting from current and anticipated national and international conditions
3
could be better effected under the revised system. Since budgeting and pro-
gramming are primarily "concerned with control and effective allocation of
limited resources toward the achievement of an almost inexhaustable range of
objectives," then every effort has to be undertaken by Defence to ensure that
a successful PPBS program is implemented. The errors of the earlier system have
been eradicated and the system is progressing to another phase in the develop-
5
ment of a totally integrated system of information for Defence.
The move toward PPBS and a total management information system will
permit a flexible approach to the government's proposed alteration to the
current budgetary cycle. The budget cycle will be altered as follows:
1. On 1 June the departments will have to submit their estimates
received from within the department to the departmental budget consoli-
dation office.
2. The budget offices within the departments will review the




By 1 September the ceiling for the Estimates will be deter-
mined by the
,
rnent and the information will be forwarded to the
de; ntal budget offices to permit final budget estimate adjust-
ments .
* I bi d
. , p. 85. frjbid., p. 91.
2
Ibid.
, p. 87. 5Ibid. , p. 76.
3 1 bid., p. 88.
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4. On I October the Defence estimates are to be forwarded to
the Minister of Finance for review*
5. After review, the Minister of Finance will forward the
Defence estimates to the Treasury Board, where they will be
examined to ensure that the estimates are compatible with the
predetermined ceilings established by the Cabinet.
6. On 1 January the Treasury Board will send the
reviewed defence estimates to the Cabinet, which will examine
them and give final approval.
7. Between the end of January and the first of April the
Department of National Defence will re-examine their estimates
and undertake any necessary adjustments caused by the time
lapse since the preparation and submission of the original
data and the classification of the expenditures by Treasury
Board.
8. On J. April the Defence estimates will be tabled before
the House of Commons and then sent to a Standing Committee on
nee for review, a procedure expected to last for six to
eight weeks.
Results o f Unificati on on
i
Def ence Budge t Development
One of the significant achievements of integration and unification
has been the reduction of personnel, military and civilian. In 1963, before
the concept was seriously considered, there were 125,000 military and 50,000
civilians in the Department of National Defence.* The Royal Canadian Air
Force I own the most rapidly until it reached a size three times as large
as it was in 1951 at the expense of the Canadian Army and the Royal Canadian
-5
Navy. At that time the Glassco Commission projected that "if the armed forces
were reduced from 125,000 to 109,000 that would leave only 40% of the military
personnel in support functions with a direct savings in salaries and benefits
of $20 million per year."*4 The cost of military personnel had risen from a










1951 figure of $184.3 million or 23.6% of the defense dollar to a 1962 level
of $616.4 million or 38.2% of the defense dollar. Thus, one half of the total
expenditure for defense was for personnel, more than that of all of the other
departments together. Military personnel accounted for 26% of 500,000 govern-
ment employees. Defence was spending 87% of all 1961-1962 expenditures on acqui-
sitions and upkeep of equipment and 60% of the total expenditure on materials
and supplies." Thus, according to the Glassco Commission, any reduction of
military personnel and the using of civilians would save funds in non-combatant
jobs. Therefore, the initial effect of unification was a reduction in military
and civilian personnel expenditures which were consuming large portions of the
defense budget and requiring a significant portion of time in relationship to
those expenditures. In the Department the unification of the three services
into one service resulted immediately in the reduction, of headquarters budget
offices and personnel staffs, \vhst resulted was a slightly enlarged headquarters
staff. However, the overall reductions in personnel, related expenses as well
• as overhead were signif leant.
The Glassco Commission found that the Department of National Defence
was performing a duplicated audit function. Service audit personnel, numbering
600 with annual salaries of $2.3 million, were mainly engaged in auditing
stores, or inventories, and the "extent of the verification performed goes well
beyond what may be regarded as necessary.*^* The Commission therefore recommend-
ed that the audit service be removed from Defence to the Chief Auditor branch











audit function staff. However, the need to maintain some internal Defence
related auditors exists.
Regarding the budget dollar, the competition for resources is no
longer between the three service Chiefs but between alternative means of
carrying out the roles assigned to the armed forces by the government. The
streamlining of the budget development process has been enhanced by the re-
moval of the former service Chiefs and the results are more along the lines
of programmed objectives than the individual desires of the services. There is
still some competition between the staffs of the sea, air, and land environments
as to how the roles can be performed, but "this is healthy in that the review
can follow the objective approach of Program Analysis of the PPBS process."
One of the effects of unification was the grouping of the three
services 1 inventories together to enable Defence to purge duplications and
obsolete material from the defense system. In its report, the Glassco Commission
noted that "armed forces possessed very lerge inventories, the estimated v&lue
of which ranged from $500 million to $750 million. By building up or drawing
down these huge quantities of materials the real cost and cash expended could
be greater than in other departments. "2 Effective control was lost by Parlia-
ment. With the unification of the inventories, improved budget planning became
a reality, for the combined inventories were better managed on a predictable
demand basis. Consequently, resources that were restricted to Defence were able
to be used for purposes other than inventory build-up.
Another budget recommendation made by the Glassco Commission was the
consideration of the accrual method of accounting. Budgets would be developed
on a cost rather than cash basis with month to month evaluation to detect
^Comptroller-General Critique, February 1971, p. 2.
^Glassco, Royal Commission, p. 63.
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important variances. Accrual accounting would automatically reflect the vari-
ances in the military inventory, a danger point in the cash system. A distinc-
tion was necessary between inventory of combat consumables acquired for war
use and those of an operating and maintenance nature. Because of high obsoles-
cence of war-like equipment, costs should be absorbed as received, while ordin-
ary operating materials and consumable supplies should be chargeable to opera-
tions as they are withdrawn from stores. This would enable better management
of the budget dollar and would increase the effective use of the budget dollars
available. With a consolidated inventory program and an accrual method of
accounting, Defence would be able to reduce the record maintenance of its pro-
grams and more effectively project needs for the years ahead. As of this date,
the Treasury Board, while having had government approval of tho concept of
accrual accounting, has not developed an approach for implementation within the
present framework of the budget system. The House of Commons has the same re-
action as th<=- United States Congress to accrual accounting in that they feel
it will cause them to lose historical perspective of budget developments. They
fear the system, and since integration and unification, they lack confidence
and respect for it.
The Glassco Commission and unification of the armed forces have
created numerous changes within Defence and also have created problems. The
results have been acceptance of concepts but not necessarily implementation.
Often Defence has encountered internal resistance to change or to adoption, of
approved concepts and principles. According to a spokesman for the Comptroller-
General's office, the new procedures previously discussed, particularly PrBS,





but is still not totally implemented. The major problem remaining is that
the; commends and management structure differ from the PPBS structure in
meeting government objectives for defense planning and budgeting, causing
o
a gap. Consequently, the present budget office in Defence spends a "great
3deal of time reconciling the two objectives with the budget." The fiscal year
1971 budget was prepared by the logistics staff at Headquarters. However, with
the implementation of various aspects of PPBS and responsibility center manage-
ment, the fiscal year budget for 1972 will be developed by the commands in the
field and then forwarded to headquarters for consolidation. This is a
significant step toward development of the recommendations proposed by the
Glassco Commission, translated by the Treasury Board into workable directives,
and adopted by Defence along with its concept of unification.
One of the concerns of an official in the office of the Comptroller-
5
General was "whether PPBS will result in savings in the long-run,"" They are
currently spending more dollars than unde.-: the three services in developing
the unified system. The concern is that .:he initial development costs will not
be returned in long-run savings through reductions of personnel and administra-
tive reporting. At this time, it is difficult for the Comptroller-General's
office to recogniae, except by prediction, the overall savings that will result
from the implementation of PPBS.
Under unification the budget development process called for cen-
tralization of activites into one headquarters office. The obvious benefits
1
Lindsay Telephone Interview, 8 February 1971.
2Powell, "Building a Fortree Canada?", p. 50.
Lindsay Telephone Interview, 8 February 1971.
Comptroller-General Critique, p. 2.
-'Lindsay Telephone Interview, 8 February 1971.
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of having one staff instead of three have been recognized. What has been
established is a sound nucleus of personnel with an intimate knowledge of
policies and procedures for defense budget development and an appreciation
of the struggles to achieve the current system. There is to be some decentrali-
zation to the field activities under the responsibility center concept in which
the lower levels of commands will develop their budget estimates for base
consolidation and then submission to headquarters for total consolidation. This
complies with the Treasury Board manual recommendations for budget development.
There is some concern with the Comptroller-General office as to whether there
will be greater efficiencies achieved through this decentralization or whether
it will result in creation of additional staffing assignments in the field to
develop the budgets that have been completed since unification on a headquar-
ters level.
Lie the overall defense structure is being reduced from a per-
sonnel stand Joint, there is some concern with the Comptroller-General office
that the staff will be too large in relationship to the reduced force
structure. They are concerned about becoming top-heavy with senior military
and civilian personnel. At this time there appears to be no real savings since
there are additional staff personnel under PFBS, thereby decreasing its
2immediate advantage.
But the concept of PPBS has been stressed by Defence and despite
some of the internal problems, it is proceeding. Where there were three ser-
vices developing their own individual demands for fund allocations, there are
now seven major programs that carry explicit approval of the Minister and





control purposes. Each program is analysed into principal components and sub-
components, such as operational force requirements, logistic and support forces,
mission training, and command and control. Each component and sub-component in
turn is analysed into elements, consisting of units or groups of units. Program
elements are the basic building blocks of the system. (See Figure 8 --- The
Basic Building Block, p. 76.) The elements are priced and data is maintained
for each element, which is then analyzed in terms of forces, equipment, finan-
cial estimates, manpower, and other resource data. The seven major programs
represent the overall approved military plans expressed in terms of missions
to be accomplished in order to achieve national and international defense
objectives. Future documentation will describe the inputs of forces, equipment,
o
manpower and expenditures required to support programs over a five year period.
The advantages of this defense program will be that the program will receive
approval in principle by the government which would then lead to a prog~£i.!:, ;od
budget.
Unification and the recommendations of the Glassco Commission
affecting the budgetary process and procedures were evaluated by the Chief of
Defence Svaff, General R. R. Sharp, as the "one solution for Canada. "^ He
went on to report that
. . .it seems right for a nation our size and in our circum-
stances. But, it doesn't follow that it would necessarily be right
for all others. It has, of course, meant. overall cuts in the armed
forces, which no military man necessarily wants to see. However,
it is working well and it certainly would have been far more diffi-
cult to restructure the forces in line with the present budget
restraints if we still had three services. In this light alone,
*Pinet, "Improved Budgeting and Programming," pp. 85-86,
2IMd,, pp. 85-86.
3 T,Md., p. 93.































































most top management feels that unification has paid for itself.
The cost of training is going dovn while efficiency is going
up. Logistics are better, t\ full automation is probably some
two years away. In the operational areas of air-sea/air-land we
have now achieved better coordination than ever before.
An effect that unification and the Glassco Commission did not induce
was the budget ceiling imposed by the government to last until 1971. Some
critics have stated that the "fiscal restraints have affected Canadian
participation in world military organizations." Yet the positive aspect
of the budget ceiling is that it has forced the Department of National Defence
to respond with some degree of originality to budget development to ensure that
the objectives of the government will be achieved. Originality in stretching
the budget dollar was called for and the Comptroller-General responded. Not
only did the Comptroller-General have to face a politically frozen defense
budget, but., as Defence Minister Cadieux reported, "our defence budget is
suffering erosion due to inflation each \ear." The introduction of a unified
budget office assisted in reducing the strain on the budget development process,
particularly with the use of the Defence Program objectives. While some pro-
grams had to be reduced or eliminated and large reductions in force promulgated,
it was evident that a centralized budget office could adequately cope with the
changes that vrere being introduced. The changes occurred rapidly, often sub-
merging some of the refinements of budget development techniques that were
anticipated for implementation. However, postponement permitted the Comptroller-
General's office to pursue other immediate programs while gaining from the v









the costs of inflation and the reduction of available funds, the government
began resorting to change through leaks to the press in hopes of mobilizing
public opinion against some of the existing programs in a determined effort
to reduce defense spending. This procedure assisted Defence in reducing pro-
grams that, while appealing to nationalistic pride, i. e., the scrapping of
the only Canadian aircraft carrier because of large cost over-runs during an
i
overhaul, were no longer required to meet current government objectives.
As unification becomes a working reality throughout the armed
forces rather than on only a headquarters level, the use of PPBS in developing
the budget for Defence will enable development of additional sub-systems that
may lead to a Total Management Information System. The sub-system on which the
office of the Comptroller-General is currently working is a standardized and
automated pay system. Other sub- systems to be developed are an automated
personnel management information system, an automated logistics support system,
and an automated costing system that will produce a print-out in various presenta-
tion formats of the Defence Program in the PPBS process. Without unification,
according to the Comptroller-General's office, "it would not have been possible
to obtain the agreement of the three services and the Deputy Minister's office
to the single approach to the maintenance and production of information systems.
There is little question that when these systems are fully operative, the data
on which our Defence Estimates are based will facilitate budget preparation and
submission."-3
Summary
The Royal Commission on Government Organization paved the way for a
Toronto Globe and Hail, 22 July 1966, p. 3.
^Comptroller-General Critique, p. 3.
3 Ibid., p. 3.
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re-examination of the financial management practices of all the departments of
the Canadian government. It also provided the impetus for the Department of
National Defence to pursue integration, a recommendation originally little
noted in the Glassco Commission report. The Minister of National Defence,
Paul Hellyer, in his White Pa per on Defence proposed that the services in order
to meet the demands of budget reductions and inflation would approach the
solution through unification of its three armed forces into a single force.
The implications of such a radical departure were many; however, in the area
of the defense budget development process, the Glassco CommS ssion recommenda-
tions coupled with unification resulted in structural and procedural changes.





An analysis of the effects of the radical concept of integration
and unification of the Canadian armed forces on the defense budget organization
and budget procedures was the objective of the thesis. Integration and
unification did alter the course of Canadian military thinking; however, as
the research progressed, it became evident that The Royal C ommission on
Government t Cnrgan
i
za t i on was the single document that most directly promoted
the eventual implementation of the concept. Its recommendation of constructive
improvements to government-wide financial management techniques in conjunction
with unification induced significant departures from traditional budget devel-
opment procedures within the defense establishment's budget office. Lefore
studying the effects that integration and unification as well as the Glassco
Commission had on the Department of National Defence, the historical perspec-
tive of integration and unification was surveyed to establish a foundation
for analysi s
«
Thus, the basis for integration and unification was the Glassco
Commission, which stimulated a re-thinking of financial management procedures
within the government. The Minister of National Defence Paul Hellyer's White
Paper •" -ne e was a direct response to the Glassco Commission recommendations.




integration and unification. ThG first motive was economic. He wanted to reduce
overall costs to allow for increased operational efficiency. Secondly, Mr.
Hellyer wanted to stimulate the Canadian defense industry. Other motives were
the creation of an independent, flexible force for a changing world, national-
istic pride, improvement of top level decision-making, and provision for more
satisfying careers for military personnel. The overall effects of integration
and unification were summarized by the Chief of Defence Staff, General R. R.
Sharp, when he stated in late 1970
... a most important element is that we are being success-
ful in healing the prime objections of individual morale and single
service traditions. We also have the advantage of being an all
volunteer force, which means our people stay longer, become experts
and highly professional. As a result, you do not need as many people.
We are going to pare down to 82,000 but we will have 82,000 pro-
fessional career soldiers.
At the same, time, General Sharp, in response to a question regarding Canada*
s
involvement with its overseas commitments* particularly NATO, reported
. . . we have had no indications from the government that
there will be more withdrawals from Europe after 1972. However,
costs are going up and we have a fixed budget at this time. Our
equipment will be running out at the end of five years. Also we
program our force structure on a five year basis, which will end
in fiscal year 1975-1976.
At that time we will be prepared to give our recommendations
to Parliament, and the Government will have to decide.
There had been some concern in some government circles regarding the reaction
of the present government toward defense in its forthcoming White Paper. Gen-
eral Sharp has indicated it will be the government that will decide the future
of the Canadian Armed Forces. In discussing the possible outcomes for the
future, one source reported that "if the Trudeau faction remains in power with
its apparent p it for greater and greater retrenchment and a disinclination
^Powell, "Building a Fortress Canada?", p. 53.
2 Ibid., p. 52.
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toward military matters, the Canadian Armed Forces may be faced vith some
stringent years ahead."
But to relieve the concerns of many within the Department of
National Defence and within the government and opposition, the present Minister
of National Defence, Donald Macdonald, in an interview with The Montreal
Gazette on 13 April 1971, reported briefly on the status of unification,
which will be detailed in his defense White Paper in May or June 1971. Mr. Macdonald
feels that "the single unified service with its integrated command structure
has proven not only feasible, relatively economic and efficient, but in the
9
context of the 70* s may be more useful than predicted in the 60* p." General
Sharp, in the same article, stated, regarding the old tri-servicc committees,
that "the; e once the most frustrating things," but now that the defense
staff is composed on "functional lines vith advice in depth, current opera-
tional expertise is mure rc-adily available., decisions are made faster, and
with more cooperation with civilian policies." All of the old battles about
capital expenditures and equipment programs, which used to be fought up to the
Minister
r
are now resolved in the defense staff, on which members from all
elements continue to sit.
General Sharp went on to report that there have been "substantial
savings as a result of unification, particularly in the reduction of tripli-
cation in logistics, communications, and training." A recent study undertaken
by Canadian defense economists shows that the Canadian defense budget, frozen
at $1.8 billion, would have risen to around $2.3 billion had the three services
been maintained. At the same time, because of the budget freeze which will not
be lifted until early 1973 and because of increasing costs of military




equipment, the percentage of capital equipment to housekeeping operations has
not risen to around 35% as Mr, Hellyer had predicted. It is still around the
23% level. Mr. Macdonald summarized his remarks by admitting the military
services "had to put up with a series of shocks during the past five years,
beginning with, the integration-unification process itself, coupled with the
foreign policy review and its de-emphasis on NATO commitments and the greatest
shock of all » the budget freeze and force cutbacks."
Canadian F inancial Management Reviewed
th integration and unification a reality in the Department of
National Defence, the thesis then concentrated on examining the financial
management procedures of the government. It was concluded that while financial
controls developed slowly within the framework of the government, they neverthe-
less progressed with the demands for better management and control of the
nation's resources. The financial management positions and the budget cycle
have remained virtually unchanged since the early 1900' s. However, The Royal
Commissi on en Government Organization, created in 1960 and reporting in 1963,
expressed concern for the lack of financial control, the increased use of man-
power, and spiralling costs of government. The Glassco Commission called for
immediate corrective actions. The Treasury Board with the Department of
Finance was charged with the responsibility for developing the procedures to
be adopted by all of the departments and agencies after the government had
accepted the recommendations in principle. To meet the basic criteria for ••
better control, better manpower utilization, and better economies, the Treasury





and Responsibility Accounting to eliminate budget development in terms of
Expenditures by Objectives. There was a call for decentralisation of the
budget process to all levels within a department while at the same time in-
creasing the accountability of all lower level managers.
Review of the Original Unification Defence Budget Objective s
Thus, in 1963 the Department of National Defence was confronted
with two significant documents that would require substantial alterations to
the existing defense structure. One was the White Paper on Def ence and the
other was The Royal Commission on Government Organization. While every aspect
of the internal structure of the Department of National Defence was affected
by the Concepts espoused in these two important documents, the area of concen-
tration in the thesis was the budget office and the budget development procedures
and processes* First examined were the original objectives of integration and
unification and the introduction of improved financial management techniques.
Organizationally, better coordination was achieved at headquarters with the
combining of the tri-servic.e budget offices into a single office, the
Comptroller-General branch. At the same time, there was a reduction in competi-
tion among the three services for budget dollars which had been directed to
their specific services. The nucleus staff that was created, while somewhat
larger in size than under the tri-service organizations, permitted flexible
expansion or decreases concurrent with the overall force structures determined
by the government.
With the creation of a single budget office, there was a reduction
in overall personnel forces within the headquarters organization because the
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three services' budget offices were dismantled and in effect combined on a
reduced scale into a single office. The effects of unification were felt in
all of the command and field offices of the three former services. Savings in
military and civilian personnel were immediately realized. With the recommenda-
tions of the Glassco Commission to reduce the audit force which was performing
duplicated functions for the government, there were immmediate reductions in
force.
The budget organisation benefited initially from unification in re-
duction of paperwork, files, and reports required to develop a budget estimate
for submission to higher authorities for defense decision-making. Consequently,
there was a more effective use of available data and a purge of unnecessary
or duplicated information.
From an organizational point of view, initially the Comptroller-
General would centralize the budget activities within headquarters as the
forces in the field adjusted to the demands and pressures of unification.
However, the centralization of functions would eventually lead to compliance
with the Treasury Board direction to decentralize to the lower levels of man-
agement to ensure that the proper information was reaching headquarters to
assist in more realistic budget development.
Within the framework of the unified defense budget office, there
were to have been achieved certain objectives in the area of budget development
and procedures necessary to produce the fiscal year budget estimates. One of
the primary objectives was the reduction of the gap between defense planning,
programming, and budgeting with that of the government's defense objectives
by establishing an overall objective which would then be divided into seven
major internal Program objectives. Another budget procedure to have been
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achieved was the introduction of an integrated program data system leading to
a Total Management Information System in which cost data, cost control, and
improved financial management techniques would be recognized through the
initial adoption of PPBS. Once PPBS had been introduced, then Responsibility
Center Accounting on all levels of management could be effected. Thus, with
better management information, there would be increased inventory control,
better projection of needs, and better use of the available resources resulting
in more efficient and effective budget development. It was also planned that
unification would reduce the time required for actual budget development.
e of the other major objectives of unification within the budget
office was the eventual adoption of the accrual method of accounting on a
actual cost basis.
Weaknesses in the Original Budget Obj ectives
There were some weaknesses not id in the initial objectives, both
organisationally and procedurally within the budget office. Organizationally,
the reaction to the single budget office was dismay at the size of the staff
required to achieve unification. The Comptroller-General was concerned that
there be immediate dollar savings recognized. However, with the initial need
for a large staff to develop a unified budget program, the reductions were
not forthcoming. While the three services had been unified, the budget office
did not necessarily gain all of the equipment necessary to achieve efficiencies
in budget preparation or for increased automation of the various proposed
systems.
After the demise of the three services, resistance to change
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remainded and in-house fighting existed in determining which former services'
concepts were better or should be adopted in part as the new policy for budget
development and organization. There was reluctance on the part of Defence to
reduce its audit function with the reasoning that as unification progressed, the
importance of audit would be recognized. Should a reduction in this function be
desired, a later termination point could be considered.
The problem of centralization and decentralization was of concern to
the Comptroller-General, for it was determined that to permit the field commands
to acheive the other aspects of unification, the budget would be developed
centrally. Decentralization would gradually, rather than immediately, evolve
as unification progressed.
As far as budget development and procedures were concerned, :here
were noticeable weaknesses in the original objectives of unification ani from
the Treasury Bojird direction and Glassco Commission recommendations. The gap
between Defence and government objectives still existed, causing disparity in
the development and effective use of the budget dollar* At the beginning of 1970,
the budget office had failed to fully adopt Program Objectives as the means of
preparing the budget.
Pi'BS created numerous problems for the Comptroller-General. With
the gap existing between defense and government objectives, there was no long-
term planning or review on a continual basis. This created probclms with budget
development, causing much time to be spent in reconciliation. Not enough data
was being accumulated at headquarters to permit effective decision-making re-
garding budget programs. The system lacked the desired flexibility for adjust-
ment to changes caused by the existing objective gaps. Initial slowness was
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recognized by the Comptroller-General In the implementation of PPHS. Conse-
quently, the move toward a Total Management Information System was slowed.
With target dates in re-thinking and restructuring budget develop-
ment procedures delayed through lack of implementation of priority programs,
little consideration was given to adoption of the accrual method of accounting.
At the same time, the Comptroller-General questioned whether there were greater
efficiencies and economies being realized in his department. However, at the
end of 1970 with the complete implementation of PPBS about to become a reality,
a staff member of the office of the Comptroller-General expressed concern
about what effect a revision of the overall government budget cycle would have
on the internal defense budget cycle.
Modificati ons to the Original Budget OMectives
The office of the Comptroller-General recognised that there were
weaknesses in the budget development system as the office moved toward unifica-
tion of the forces and policies. Consequently, there has been continued improve-
ment in the headquarters office to reduce personnel as various programs are
implemented and new equipment is purchased. In the long-run, savings in
personnel, equipment, and time will be recognized.
Increasing automation will reduce record and file maintenance while
providing improved data to assist in implementation of management information
systems. The budget office is readying the adoption of various systems to
simplify the development of future budgets. With the frozen budget ceiling
there has been greater emphasis on coordination of government and defense
objectives to project and develop budgets along program lines. More data is
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being provided that enables better decision-making in budget development. The
adoption of the budget preparation procedures directed by the Treasury Board
is underway and will result in more decentralization of the headquarters
office.
Thus, according to the office of the Comptroller-General
... it can be said that integration and unification have
removed the inter-service competition and together with the intro-
duction of Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System within the
framework of one Defence Program, has put the competition for
resources on a more comprehensive and total systems approach relating
Objectives to Forces, Forces to Tasks, Tasks to Resources and
Resources to Costs, thereby greatly enhancing Defence budgeting.
What the thesis appears to have proved is that a concept of
integration and unification of an armed forces into a single force structure
can be effective for a particular nation facing internal and financial pres-
sures similar to Canada. From the point of observation of the budget office of
the Canadian Armed Forces, it can be stated that greater efficiencies and
economies of personnel, dollars, and time in organisation and procedural
development of a defense budget can be and are being achieved as the unified
system matures with experience and time.
Areas for Further Study
The applicability of the Canadian concept to armed forces of other
nations with similar problems would provide for a challenging and useful
comparative study. At the same time, the pursuit of various aspects of the
Canadian experience may be adaptable to certain areas of a large defense
structure, such as the United States Department of Defense.
However, further study of the Canadian experience should be delayed
^Comptroller-General Critique, p. 3.
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until the forthcoming White raper on Defence is issued in May or June 1971.
Then the exisiting system should be analyzed in terms of what is proposed for
the defense structure in future years.
The Department of National Defence budget office and its budget
development procedures should be examined from time to time to evaluate the
effectiveness of the adoption of a working PPBS, to study the benefits to be
derived from the Total Management Information System, and to examine the
automated personnel management and pay systems when they become operational.
The budget office, after further reductions in its personnel structure and
with the addition of new equipment and techniques, will be an areas for
continued study. The most singular positive aspect of the Defence budget office
has been itr; ability to closely examine itself, to discern its weaknesses, and
then to undertake every effort to correct its deficiencies to provide for
better coordination, more effective use of manpower, and the achievement of
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